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WHICH CASES ARE "SUCH CASES":
INTERPRETING AND APPLYING SECTION 12
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Adam B. Perry*
This Note examines an issue currently dividing the nation's circuit courts
of appeal. The issue presented is how courts should interpret and apply
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, the long-arm and venue statute for private
antitrust actions brought against corporate defendants. Section 12's poor
construction has resulted in courts applying section 12 differently to similar
sets of facts. This Note thoroughly discusses section 12 as it relates to
antitrust law generally and the procedural elements of bringing a private
antitrust action in federal court, examines the existing section 12 case law
that illustrates the conflict and the arguments on both sides, and proposes a
hybrid solution that best satisfies Congress's intent.
INTRODUCTION
In Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine,' the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an antitrust suit brought
in the Western District of New York fifteen years earlier for lack of
personal jurisdiction over the defendants and improper venue.2  In
dismissing the action, the court decided an issue that currently divides the
nation's circuit courts. The issue is how to interpret section 12 of the
Clayton Act-the long-arm statute for private antitrust actions brought
against corporate defendants.3 More specifically, the issue is whether the
section's service of process provision is available only to litigants who lay
venue pursuant to the section. Section 12 contains a venue clause and a
worldwide service of process clause. 4 In Daniel, the Second Circuit read
section 12 as an integrated whole-the integrated reading requires that a
plaintiff establish venue under the provisions of section 12 in order to take
advantage of section 12's liberal personal jurisdiction clause. 5 Other courts
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008. 1 would like to thank Professor
Marc Arkin for her excellent guidance and insight throughout the Note-writing process and
Professor Richard Squire for his feedback on certain sections of this Note. I would also like
to thank Nicole and my family for all of their love and support.
1. 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).
2. Id.; see also infra note 180.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
4. Id.
5. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 423.
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read section 12 broadly and permit plaintiffs to utilize the section's personal
jurisdiction provision while establishing venue through the general
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.6
Depending on how a court reads section 12, a litigant either may have the
benefit of worldwide service of process, and thus personal jurisdiction over
the defendant in any federal district court in the nation, no matter how
venue is established (including through section 12 or 28 U.S.C. § 1391-
the standard venue provision), or may obtain the benefit of worldwide
service only if the litigant establishes venue through section 12. 7 If a
plaintiff cannot utilize section 12, he must establish personal jurisdiction
under the more restrictive ordinary principles of personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, a court's reading of section 12 has major implications for where a
private plaintiff may haul a corporate antitrust defendant into court for
antitrust violations.
This Note examines Daniel and several other recent cases that illustrate
the competing interpretations of section 12, and the impact of the two
alternative readings on private antitrust litigation. Most importantly, this
Note demonstrates that, properly viewed, section 12 actually involves two
separate issues, requiring two separate outcomes. The different general
venue provisions with respect to domestic and alien defendants result in the
two types of defendants being affected differently by a broad reading of
section 12.
Part I discusses the purpose of private antitrust litigation as well as the
substantive and procedural elements necessary for a plaintiff to sue a
corporate defendant for antitrust violations. Part II discusses the conflict
currently dividing the nation's circuit courts. Thus, Part II focuses on the
two competing readings of section 12 by presenting case law and academic
work that supports each reading. Part II also reviews the effects of each
reading on private antitrust suits against domestic and foreign defendants.
Part III proposes a reading of section 12 that works best with the purpose of
both the statutory venue requirement and private antitrust litigation itself.
The proposed solution notes that the conflict may be resolved by
recognizing that disparate treatment is appropriate depending on whether
the defendant is a domestic or alien party.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000); see infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.3.a-b for a discussion of the general venue provisions and section
12's venue provision.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Antitrust Law Generally
1. The Antitrust Laws
Modem antitrust law and policy are rooted in the Sherman Act, 8 enacted
in 1890, and the Clayton Act, 9 enacted in 1914. Certain sections of these
statutes prohibit conduct deemed by Congress to be anticompetitive.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements that unreasonably l0
restrain "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations."'11  Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization,
attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize
any industry. 12  Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits price
discrimination, 13 and section 3 of the Clayton Act proscribes tying and
exclusive dealing contracts "where the effect ... may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 14  Section 7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."1 5 Courts, Congress, and commentators all refer to the Sherman
and Clayton Acts and certain other statutes simply as the "[a]ntitrust
laws."16
2. The Purpose of the Antitrust Laws
Undoubtedly, Congress designed the antitrust laws to further and protect
competition. As Justice John Paul Stevens noted in 1978, "The Sherman
Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.... [T]he statutory
policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad."' 7 Although the U.S. Supreme Court once understood protecting
8. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
9. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2000)).
10. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911) (observing that all contracts
restrain trade and holding that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited by the
Sherman Act).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
12. Id. § 2.
13. Id. § 13.
14. Id. § 14.
15. Id. § 18.
16. Id. § 12(a). For a list of the statutes and regulations that make up the "antitrust
laws," see Am. Antitrust Inst., Codes: Federal Antitrust Statutes and Regulations,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Antitrust-Resources/AntitrustSTATUTES/index.ashx (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
17. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
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competition as protecting competitors, 18 the Court now protects competition
in order to protect consumer welfare. For example, in 1993, writing on
behalf of the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,19 Justice Anthony Kennedy constructed a test under which the
antitrust laws prohibit predatory pricing only if the below-cost pricing party
(the defendant) is likely to recoup its losses by way of supra-competitive
prices after driving the target (the plaintiff) out of the market.20 The Court
did not want to prohibit unsuccessful predatory pricing because
"unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers." 21 The Court
continued,
That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of
no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured .... Even
an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not,
without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do
not create a federal law of unfair competition. 22
Clearly, under this treatment of competition and the purpose of the antitrust
laws, a firm injured by the unsavory business practices of a competitor must
establish injury to consumers-as well as itself-in order to bring a private
antitrust action.
3. Public and Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
Section 4 of the Sherman Act establishes that "it shall be the duty of the
several United States attorneys . . . to institute proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain" violations of the antitrust laws. 23 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act creates a private right of action for antitrust injuries; it provides
that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue." 24
The ability of the U.S. government to bring a civil or criminal action for
antitrust violations empowers the government to deter and prevent conduct
that Congress has determined to be harmful to the economy. The existence
of a private right of action also deters and prevents injurious conduct. The
purpose of providing a private right of action for those injured by antitrust
violations is no different than the purpose of any other tort law: to provide
redress for those harmed and to deter injurious conduct. Section 4 of the
18. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). In Brown
Shoe, Chief Justice Earl Warren, referring to section 7 of the Clayton Act, stated, "[W]e
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization." Id.
19. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
20. Id. at 224.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 224-25.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
24. Id. § 15(a).
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Clayton Act provides that a private plaintiff who has been injured "by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained. '25  The inclusion of a treble damage
multiplier in section 4 further indicates that Congress intended private
actions to serve a meaningful deterrent function and creates a significant
incentive for private parties to sue antitrust violators.
The Supreme Court noted in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready26 that
the
lack of restrictive language [in section 4 of the Clayton Act] reflects
Congress' 'expansive remedial purpose' in enacting [section] 4: Congress
sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter
violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would
provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. 27
The broad remedial purpose of section 4 is evidenced by Congress's
decision to grant the district courts the power to "prevent and restrain" any
violation of the antitrust laws by way of injunction or prohibition and even
by "temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just"
prior to a final judgment. 28 The Court also noted that "'[t]he statute does
not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors,
or to sellers .... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated.' 29
Although section 4 contains broad language, it does not allow just any
person to act as a private U.S. attorney. In Blue Shield, the Court also
observed that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to
allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to
maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his
business or property."' 30 In order to sue, an antitrust plaintiff must establish
that (1) he suffered an antitrust injury, (2) his suit will not subject the
defendant to duplicative recovery, and (3) he has antitrust standing. 3 1
25. Id. In fact, the court does not inform the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to treble
damages. The jury awards damages based on the plaintiff's injuries and the trial judge
multiplies the award by three. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems 70 (5th ed. 2004).
26. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
27. Id. at 472 (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978)).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 4.
29. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 472 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
30. Id. at 477.
31. See C. Douglas Floyd & E. Thomas Sullivan, Private Antitrust Actions: The
Structure and Process of Civil Antitrust Litigation 632 (1996 & Supp. 2005).
2007] 1181
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
a. Antitrust Injury
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,32 the Supreme Court
held that "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury ... of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation."33  Simply put, antitrust injury is an injury brought on by a
decrease in competition. A plaintiff may not sue for an antitrust violation
when an increase in competition has caused his injury because the plaintiff
has not suffered an antitrust injury.
b. Prohibition on Duplicative Recovery and the
Direct Purchaser Requirement
A second requirement to bring suit applies to plaintiffs who allegedly
have been injured by paying supra-competitive prices for goods or services.
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,34 the Supreme Court held that only the
direct purchaser of anticompetitively priced goods may sue the antitrust
violator.35  An example makes this requirement clear. Assume three
automobile manufacturers collude to fix prices above the competitive rate
and that dealers purchase the new cars they sell from manufacturers.
Assume also that automobile manufacturers set wholesale prices and that
automobile dealers set the retail price that consumers pay. Consumers who
purchased a new car made by one of the price-fixing manufacturers may not
seek damages from the manufacturers for horizontal price-fixing. Only the
dealers may seek damages from the price-fixing manufacturers because the
dealers are direct purchasers from those manufacturers.
In Illinois Brick, the Court gave two primary reasons for imposing the
direct purchaser requirement on antitrust plaintiffs: (1) allowing offensive
use of the pass-on argument will lead to duplicative liability for antitrust
defendants, 36 and (2) allowing plaintiffs to sue for passed-on overcharges
would create exceedingly complex litigation "in the real economic world"
32. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
33. Id. at 489.
34. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
35. Id. This holding prevents plaintiffs from suing manufacturers and arguing that some
of the increased cost charged to the dealer was passed on to them; this is known as offensive
pass-on. Defendants also are barred from utilizing the pass-on theory as a defense to suit by
a dealer who purchased supra-competitively priced goods. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 482 (1968) (holding that a direct purchaser could recover
in damages all of the increased cost resulting from price-fixing, whether or not the defendant
could prove that any portion of that cost had been passed on to the next party in the vertical
distribution chain).
36. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730. Using the automobile manufacturer cartel example, a
consumer could not sue a manufacturer for price-fixing and argue that the dealer passed on
some of the increased cost to him at the retail level.
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where true costs are very difficult to determine. 37 Not all private antitrust
litigation involves a party seeking damages for goods purchased above cost,
so the direct purchaser requirement does not always apply. However, the
rationale behind the requirement always applies: any time it appears that
the maintenance of suit will lead to duplicative or speculative recovery,
courts will be wary of allowing suit to proceed. 38 The antitrust standing
requirement also furthers this goal.
c. Antitrust Standing
Antitrust standing is the third requirement; however, there is overlap with
the antitrust injury requirement. 39 Antitrust standing protects defendants
from claimants whose injury was tangentially caused by antitrust violations.
To determine if a party has antitrust standing, a court must engage in an
analysis similar to a proximate cause analysis in tort law.4 0 The Supreme
Court attempted to provide guidance and instructed courts to
look (1) to the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation
and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2), more particularly, to the relationship
of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress was
likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful
and in providing a private remedy under [section] 4.41
In Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. ,42 the Supreme Court noted
that a "showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to
establish standing ... because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but
may not be a proper plaintiff ... for other reasons. '43 Lower courts have
found that those "other reasons" are factors that make the plaintiff an
inefficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. 44 Thus, the antitrust standing
analysis also requires a court to determine whether the plaintiff is a proper
one.
45
37. Id. at 731-32 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493).
38. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542-44 (1983) (using "speculative measure of harm," "risk of
duplicative recovery," and avoiding "complex apportionment of damages" as three of seven
factors relevant to the standing inquiry).
39. It is helpful to conceptualize the three requirements as a Venn diagram in which the
portion in the middle where all three circles overlap represents those parties who may sue an
antitrust violator.
40. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982).
41. Id. at 478.
42. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
43. Id. at I10 n.5.
44. Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 797 n.9 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Todorov v. D.C.H.
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
45. The factors relevant to determining whether the plaintiff is a proper plaintiff were
first discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors of California,
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540-45 (1983), three years
before Cargill. However, because the Associated General factors on their own caused much
confusion in the lower courts, any discussion beyond that of "antitrust injury" was viewed as
dicta. See Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1451 n.20. The Court in Cargill adopted that dictum as the
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B. Procedural Elements-Statutory and Federal Rules Provisions
Governing Federal Question Actions in Federal Court
For a plaintiff to sue in federal court, he must establish proper subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and venue.
Title 28 contains a number of general provisions that specify how a plaintiff
may satisfy the three procedural elements. In addition, certain substantive
federal laws contain their own venue and personal jurisdiction provisions.
Thus, section 12 of the Clayton Act contains its own venue and personal
jurisdiction provisions that may apply in all antitrust suits brought by a
private plaintiff against a corporate defendant.
A portion of section 12 is the Clayton Act's long-arm statute; its primary
purpose is to "broaden[] the authority of courts over absent defendants who
are otherwise not subject to the territorial power of the state" in which suit
is brought.46 Section 12 of the Clayton Act also contains a venue provision.
Section 12, entitled "District in which to sue corporation," states,
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts
business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.4 7
The portion of text before the semicolon is the venue provision; the portion
of text after the semicolon is the personal jurisdiction provision.4 8 At issue
in this Note is how courts should interpret section 12-specifically, whether
the former provision must be satisfied to take advantage of the latter, or
more simply-which cases are "such cases."
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Generally
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. 49 Within their constitutional powers, federal courts may only
second prong of the standing analysis. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in Daniel, listed the four factors that courts generally consider relevant to the efficient
enforcer inquiry:
(1) "the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury"; (2) "the existence of an
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement"; (3) "the speculativeness of
the alleged injury"; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning
them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries.
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Volvo N.
Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof'I Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 540-45)).
46. See Floyd & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 36.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
48. See Daniel, 428 F.3d at 422.
49. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2.
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adjudicate cases that Congress has given them the authority to adjudicate. 50
The Supreme Court has noted that subject matter jurisdiction is both a
constitutional and statutory requirement that "functions as a restriction on
federal power."'51 The two principal forms of jurisdiction given to the
courts by Congress are diversity jurisdiction 52 and federal question
jurisdiction. 53 The statute creating federal question jurisdiction grants the
district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 54 A private action in
which the plaintiff alleges a violation of the federal antitrust laws obviously
falls within federal question jurisdiction because the suit arises under the
laws of the United States.
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Extraterritorial
Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws
A district court can only hear a case in which a private plaintiff alleges
that a defendant's conduct abroad violated U.S. antitrust law if it has
subject matter jurisdiction. To have subject matter jurisdiction over the
case, the antitrust laws must reach the defendant's extraterritorial conduct.55
50. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1368 (2000).
51. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts of civil
actions between citizens of different states or between a citizen of a state and a foreign party
where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).
53. Id. § 1331.
54. Id.
55. For purposes of this Note, the extraterritoriality analysis is characterized as a
question of subject matter jurisdiction because the majority opinion in Hartford Fire
Insurance Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), written by Justice David Souter,
characterized the analysis as one of subject matter jurisdiction. John A. Trenor, Comment,
Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws after Hartford Fire, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1583, 1597 (1995). Justice Souter framed the analysis "as one of whether to
decline subject matter jurisdiction." Id.
However, Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting with three other justices, disagreed with
Justice Souter: "[T]he extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act [] has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law ..... Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at
813. This analysis is one of legislative jurisdiction. See id.; Trenor, supra, at 1598. The
legislative jurisdiction analysis determines first whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction, which it does when a plaintiff has made a nonfrivolous claim under the Sherman
Act. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 812. Next, the analysis considers "whether, in enacting the
Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct." Id. at 813;
see also Trenor, supra, at 1598. The second question is answered by performing an
international conflict of laws comity analysis. This requires the court to accept that the
Sherman Act covers the conduct in question and then determine whether the Sherman Act
should apply based on whether it conflicts with the law of the nation where the conduct
occurred. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817; David P. Currie et al., Conflict of Laws:
Cases-Comments-Questions 766 (6th ed. 2001); Trenor, supra, at 1599. Professor David
Currie believes that Justice Scalia got it right, noting, "Justice Souter is not alone in
confusing the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and choice of law. Many judges
and international lawyers make the same mistake, using the term 'subject matter jurisdiction'
in international cases to refer to judicial decisions limiting the scope of the claim on comity
2007] 1185
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Since 1945, the federal courts have applied U.S. antitrust law to conduct
occurring outside the United States. 56 The courts abandoned the strict
territorial application of federal antitrust law following Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).57
One of the many issues raised by the government in Alcoa was whether
Aluminum Limited (Limited), a Canadian corporation, had unlawfully
conspired with Alcoa, an American corporation, to form a cartel with other
foreign producers of aluminum.58 Although it was clear that Limited and
several European producers had formed a cartel, the evidence indicated that
Alcoa was not a member of the cartel. 59 The cartel fixed the output of each
member and required any party that produced more than its quota to pay a
royalty to the other cartel members.60 All the cartel members agreed that
exports to the United States counted toward the production quotas. 61 For
this Note, the pertinent aspect of Alcoa was the court's determination that
Limited, a foreign corporation, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by
forming a cartel with French, German, Swiss, and British corporations that
acted outside the U.S. borders, but which affected the U.S market.62
The Second Circuit noted that the cartel agreement "would clearly have
been unlawful, had [it] been made within the United States." 63 Judge Hand
framed the analysis as "whether Congress chose to attach liability to the
conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it[,]...
grounds." Currie et al., supra, at 766. Even if Justice Souter "got it wrong," he was writing
for the majority of the Supreme Court in an opinion that remains good law. However, a
practitioner should address both methods of analysis, especially because Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and Harry Blackmun, who joined Justice
Souter to make up the majority, are no longer on the Court (only Justices Souter and John
Paul Stevens remain from the majority). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is the only dissenting
justice no longer on the Court; Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas remain with
Justice Scalia from the dissent. See Hartford Fire, 508 U.S. at 766; Trenor, supra, at 1599
n.83.
56. Before United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), the U.S. antitrust laws were only applied to conduct occurring within the country. See
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909) (holding that conduct
occurring outside the United States did not violate the Sherman Act).
57. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416. The government lost at trial and appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. The Court was unable to meet the statutory quorum of six Justices because
four justices recused themselves. In response, Congress passed a law which provided that
the court of last resort in cases where the Supreme Court cannot muster a quorum shall be
the appropriate court of appeals, with the three most senior judges sitting on panel. Alcoa
has traditionally carried the precedential weight of a Supreme Court decision because the
Second Circuit was sitting as the court of last resort. See Sullivan & Hovenkamp, supra note
25, at 607; Trenor supra note 55, at 1590 n.37.
58. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422, 439-45.
59. Id. at 442 (concluding that Alcoa was not a member of the cartel referred to as the
"Alliance").
60. Id. at 443. The members formed the cartel by forming a corporation in Switzerland.
Presumably, the corporation was legal in Switzerland, whereas an agreement of that sort
would undoubtedly be illegal and unenforceable in the United States, See id. at 442.
61. Id. at442.
62. Id. at 443.
63. Id. at 444.
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whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether [the U.S.]
Constitution permitted it to do So.''64 Judge Hand analogized the situation
to one between two states, where under settled conflict of laws doctrine a
state may apply its own laws to impose liability on an out-of-state party for
conduct occurring outside the state that caused proscribed consequences in
the state. 65 Judge Hand then articulated what has come to be known as "an
intended effects test," 66 stating, "[W]e shall assume that the Act does not
cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports,
unless ... performance [of the agreement] is shown actually to have had
some effect upon [exports to the United States]. Where both conditions are
satisfied, the situation certainly falls within [federal law]."'67 Accordingly,
where a foreign defendant, by his foreign conduct, intended to affect
exports to the United States and did actually affect them, he may be held
accountable if his foreign conduct violated U.S. antitrust law. The court
went on to find that Limited's agreement to restrict exports to the United
States violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 68
Almost fifty years after Alcoa, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California,69 the Supreme Court modified Alcoa's "intended effects test"
and raised the bar to an "intended substantial effects test."'70  Most
significantly, the Court unequivocally endorsed the application of U.S.
antitrust law to conduct occurring outside the United States. In Hartford
Fire, the Court found that there was subject matter jurisdiction in a suit
against foreign parties based on the plaintiffs allegation that the alien
defendants conspired to affect the U.S. insurance market, and that their
conspiracy produced a substantial effect on the U.S. market. 71 In the face
of the defendant's claim that its conduct was legal where performed, the
Court addressed the possibility of a "true conflict" between U.S. law and
foreign law. However, it found that a "true conflict" was not present
because the defendant could have complied with the laws of both
countries. 72  Accordingly, the Court did not extensively address the
matter. 73
64. Id. at 443.
65. Id. ("[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends .... (citations omitted)).
66. See Trenor supra note 55, at 1590 & n.39.
67. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 445.
69. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
70. Id. at 796.
71. Id. at 798.
72. Id. at 798, 799 ("No conflict exists ... 'where a person subject to regulation by two
states can comply with the laws of both."' (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law § 403 cmt. e (1987))).
73. Id. at 799 ("We have no need in this litigation to address other considerations that
might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of
international comity.").
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Thus, the analysis for determining whether a court may apply the federal
antitrust laws extraterritorially has two steps. First, the court must
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction by ascertaining whether
the foreign conduct was intended to "produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States." 74 Second, the court must ensure
that there is not a "true conflict" between the laws of the United States and
the laws of the place of the conduct. 75 If there is a "true conflict," the court
must apply the doctrine of international comity to determine whether the
court should refrain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. 76 The court
must dismiss the suit if comity dictates that U.S. law may not be applied.
2. Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases
In order to adjudicate a claim against a defendant, due process requires
that the court have personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction gives the
court the power to issue a binding personal judgment over the defendant.
Courts obtain personal jurisdiction by validly serving process on a party. 77
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 grants federal courts the power to serve
process on corporate defendants "who could be subjected to the jurisdiction
of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is
located" 78 or "when authorized by a statute of the United States." 79
Process is valid if it falls within the statutory authorization and if the
assertion of personal jurisdiction does not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. Therefore, each defendant has two sources of
protection, the statute that authorizes service and the applicable due process
clause. In federal question cases, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, not that of the Fourteenth Amendment, governs personal
jurisdiction.80 In cases where section 12 applies, the service of process
provision provides the necessary statutory authority for service pursuant to
Federal Rule 4(k)(1)(D). When section 12 does not apply, the long-arm
statute of the state where the district court sits applies pursuant to Federal
Rule 4(k)(l)(A).8 As will become apparent later, a state long-arm statute
74. Id. at 796.
75. Id. at 798.
76. See Trenor, supra note 55, at 1594-96. For an example of a comity analysis as the
second step of the inquiry, coming after a finding of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
"effects test," see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d
Cir. 1979).
77. See, e.g., Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th
Cir. 1986).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(A).
79. Id. 4(k)(1)(D).
80. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (discussing
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause throughout the opinion as the relevant clause); see
also 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1068.1 (3rd
ed. 2002) ("It is now clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, rather than the
Fourteenth, Amendment applies to the assertion of personal jurisdiction in the federal
question context.").
81. See Omni Capital Int'l, 484 U.S. at 108; see also Wright & Miller, supra note 80.
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is often more restrictive than section 12 as to when process may be served.
At issue in this Note is under what circumstances section 12 of the Clayton
Act authorizes service of process and thus personal jurisdiction over a
corporate defendant, and under what circumstances must the plaintiff resort
to the ordinary provisions of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) to establish personal
jurisdiction.
a. Fifth Amendment Due Process of Law
Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, circuit courts of
appeals, when presented with section 12 issues, have repeatedly held that
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that the defendant
must have minimum contacts with the nation as a whole. For example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Automotive Refinishing
Paint Antitrust Litigation,82 held that "personal jurisdiction in federal
antitrust litigation is assessed on the basis of a defendant's aggregate
contacts with the United States as a whole." 83 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in Go- Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co.,84 observed that
where section 12 confers personal jurisdiction, the court must ensure that
the maintenance of suit does not "offend[] traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 85 The court explained that Fifth Amendment Due
Process compliance was measured by a national contacts analysis.86 The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas applied the law of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Management Insights, Inc. v.
CIC Enterprises, Inc.87 The court noted that where a federal statute
provides nationwide service of process, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides the necessary constitutional protection, and "the
appropriate modus for ascertaining personal jurisdiction in a case that
implicates this type of statute becomes a simple recitation of the question
whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the sovereignty of the
United States." 88 It is thus apparent that the Due Process requirement in
federal question jurisdiction presents a boundary that is likely less
restrictive than the statute providing authorization for service.
82. 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 298. In In re Automotive Paint, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
read section 12 broadly. See infra notes 251-71 and accompanying text. Therefore, its
holding applied to all federal antitrust litigation. A court that reads section 12 as an
integrated whole would apply this holding only to cases where section 12's venue clause was
satisfied, thus allowing a plaintiff to invoke section 12's worldwide service of process
clause. Otherwise the state long-arm statute would limit personal jurisdiction.
84. 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 1415.
86. Id.
87. 194 F. Supp. 2d 520 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
88. Id. at 523 (citing Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 97 F.3d 822, 825-




i. State Long-Arm Authorization of Service
Although private antitrust actions raise federal questions, without the
assistance of section 12, the plaintiff must serve process pursuant to Rule
4(k)(1)(A) which requires compliance with the long-arm statute of the state
where the district court sits.89 The state long-arm statute guides its courts in
determining when a plaintiff may validly serve out-of-state parties and
subject them to personal jurisdiction in the state's courts. The provisions of
the long-arm statute, in the federal question context, may allow the exercise
of personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Some states simply have chosen to extend their long-
arm statute as far as due process allows, 90 while other states have
enumerated long-arm statutes that articulate with specificity what situations
will allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
party. 91 Although the Fifth Amendment provides the outer due process
boundary, when states have enumerated long-arn statutes, the inquiry is
often similar to a Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts analysis as
enumerated long-arm statutes require contacts with the forum. For
example, in Daniel, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
York tested personal jurisdiction for corporate defendants to whom section
12 did not apply by engaging in a detailed minimum contacts analysis for
each defendant pursuant to the provisions of the state long-arm statute. 92
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment contains
the appropriate due process clause in federal question cases, some courts
still apply Fourteenth Amendment principles in conjunction with the long-
89. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108-10 (1987);
see, e.g., Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F.Supp. 127, 201-06 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(discussing establishing personal jurisdiction over defendants to whom section 12 does not
apply and requiring the plaintiffs to satisfy the New York long-arm statute by establishing
minimum contacts with New York).
90. California, for example, has an unenumerated long-arm statute. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 410.10 (West 2004) ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.").
91. New York, for example, has an enumerated long-arm statute. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
302 (Consol. 2006) ("As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the
state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a tortious
act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from
the act; or 3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the
act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered,
in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns,
uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.").
92. Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 201-55.
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arm statute. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in
GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., concluded that section 12
did not apply to the corporate antitrust defendants and discussed
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants by looking to the
district's long-arm statute. 93 Although the long-arm would have permitted
suit in the district, the court concluded due process would not allow suit
because the defendants lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the
forum.
9 4
ii. Section 12 Authorization of Service
Section 12's second provision undoubtedly provides for worldwide
service of process. 95 If a court permits a plaintiff to utilize section 12,
Federal Rule 4(k)(1)(D) gives him the power to serve process on a
corporate antitrust defendant wherever the defendant may be found.
Additionally, the Third Circuit, in In re Automotive Paint,96 held that
"personal jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Clayton Act is as broad as the
limits of due process under the Fifth Amendment. '9 7 Where section 12
authorizes service, the Fifth Amendment's liberal national contacts analysis
is not just the outer boundary, it is the only boundary on the personal
jurisdiction inquiry. Thus, when the plaintiff can utilize section 12's
worldwide service of process provision, the defendant can only escape
personal jurisdiction by establishing that his aggregate contacts with the
nation are inadequate.9 8 This is not a plausible argument for a domestic
93. GTE New Media Serv. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347, 1350-51 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 1349-50.
95. See generally Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 422 (2d Cir.
2005); Floyd & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 35-36.
96. See supra text accompanying note 83.
97. In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d. at 299; see also Action Embroidery Corp. v. At.
Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the relevant forum with
which a defendant must have "minimum contacts" in a suit brought under section 12 is the
nation as a whole); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that under section 12 of the Clayton Act "personal jurisdiction may be established
in any district, given the existence of sufficient national contacts"). See generally Floyd &
Sullivan supra note 31, at 40.
98. This is a distinct analysis from the question of whether the antitrust laws apply
extraterritorially. The question of extraterritorial application looks to the defendant's
conduct outside the United States and is the focus of the subject matter jurisdiction analysis.
The personal jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the defendant's contacts with the United States
as a whole; because both analyses employ an "effects test" there likely will be some overlap.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.
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defendant, 99 but a foreign defendant might be able to successfully argue
that its contacts with the United States are inadequate. 100
3. Venue
a. Venue Generally
The third procedural element that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to sue
in federal court is venue. The Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he purpose of
statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a
plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial."10 1 Title 28, §
1391(b) provides where a plaintiff may properly lay venue in a federal
question case. 10 2 Unless otherwise provided for by federal law, § 1391
provides that venue is proper only in the following three locations:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside
in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial
district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought. 10 3
There are two more general venue provisions that are relevant to the section
12 issue: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides that "[a]n alien may be
sued in any district," 10 4 and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which provides in part
that a corporate defendant "shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district
in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced."' 1 5  Therefore, a corporate defendant subject to personal
jurisdiction in the district cannot contest venue because the defendant
99. See Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (N.D. Tex.
2001) ("[T]he appropriate modus for ascertaining personal jurisdiction... becomes a simple
recitation of the question whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the sovereignty
of the United States. For domestic defendants-that is, defendants residing within the four
comers of the nation-the question is answered before it is even asked.").
100. See Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 718 (5th Cir.
1999) (following Go-Video's national contacts test for personal jurisdiction under the
Clayton Act, but holding that, "while there may be some additional evidence of [the foreign
defendant] doing business with the U.S., there is no evidence qualitatively different on the
subject of doing business in the U.S. for what we deem to be a relevant time period ....
Thus, Clayton Act personal jurisdiction over the antitrust claims is also unavailable"); see
also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 307 F. Supp. 2d 145, 151-58
(D. Me. 2004), cert. denied, DaimlerChrysler Canada, Inc. v. Jaynes, 544 U.S. 904 (2005)
(discussing thoroughly multiple parties' nationwide contacts as part of nationwide minimum
contacts analysis).
101. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979); see also Wachovia
Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (restating Leroy's purpose of statutory venue
even though Leroy was litigated before a different venue statute).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 1391(d).
105. Id. § 1391(c).
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resides in the district and venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1) and (c). 10 6 In
addition, a foreign defendant has no venue rights at all because he is
amenable to suit in any district pursuant to § 139 1(d).
As previously discussed in this section, the general venue provisions
make it easy for a plaintiff to establish proper venue when suing a corporate
defendant, especially an alien corporate defendant. As will be shown later
in this Note, section 12 of the Clayton Act has the potential to obliterate the
venue analysis entirely. 107 Ordinarily, district courts have three main tools
to protect the defendant's venue right to a fair and convenient forum: (1)
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, 10 8 (2) the federal venue
transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, and (3) the federal dismissal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1406.109 These latter two tools apply equally to private antitrust
actions, no matter how venue is established.10
Congress gave the district courts the power to transfer the case to a
preferable federal district when it enacted 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.
Section 1406 allows a district court hearing a case filed without proper
venue to dismiss the case or transfer it to a district court "in which it could
have been brought."' I  Section 1404(a) gives the district court the authority
to transfer the case "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice . . . to any other district court or division where [suit]
might have been brought."1 12 Section 1404(a) operates similarly to the
forum non conveniens doctrine except it applies in situations where the
court has the authority to transfer. However, the standard for a § 1404(a)
transfer is considerably lower than the standard for a forum non conveniens
dismissal. The Supreme Court compared the two doctrines in Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick:
[Congress] intended to do more than just codify the existing law on forum
non conveniens .... Congress, in writing § 1404 (a), which was an
entirely new section, was revising as well as codifying. The harshest
result of the application of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens,
dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in § 1404 (a) for
transfer .... As a consequence, we believe that Congress, by the term
"for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,"
intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience. This is not to say that the relevant factors have changed
106. If there are multiple defendants, all defendants must be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the state pursuant to § 1391(b)(1).
107. See infra Parts I.B.3, II.B.
108. The forum non conveniens doctrine is not applicable in a federal antitrust suit.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
federal antitrust litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000); United States v. Nat'l City Lines,
Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1948) (holding that forum non conveniens is not applicable in
antitrust suits).
109. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406.
110. See United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that
the discretion to be exercised is broader. 113
Section 1404(a) gives the district court broad discretion to transfer.' 14 The
discretion afforded to the district court in conjunction with the fact-
intensive nature of the § 1404(a) inquiry makes it impractical to quantify
what "the convenience of the parties and witnesses" and "the interest of
justice" actually mean in practice. 115 As a general matter, district courts
typically consider the following factors: convenience of the parties and
witnesses, the plaintiffs forum choice, where the claim arose, and the
relative ease of access to evidence. 116 District courts measure the relative
convenience of the parties as well. The burden is on the moving party to
establish that another more convenient forum exists where maintenance of
suit will not inconvenience the nonmoving party." 17  District courts
typically consider the following factors to determine if a transfer is "in the
interests of justice": the local interest in the matter and the comparative
congestion of the courts where the plaintiff filed the action compared to
where transfer is sought.118
Although the federal courts have the tools to prevent suit in an unfair
forum, the courts do not easily grant a § 1404(a) transfer motion. For
example, when an Australian plaintiff sued a Washington defendant for
antitrust violations based on a contract negotiated in Hawaii in L. C. O'Neil
Trucks Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co.,' 9 the U.S. District Court
for the District of Hawaii denied a motion to transfer to federal court in
Washington.' 20 The Hawaii court reasoned that the defendant had "carried
on more than minimal business activities in the District" and was not
persuaded by the defendant's argument that it would "incur great expense
and undue hardship in transporting witnesses and documents to Hawaii in
order to properly defend [the] action."'121 The court also placed particular
emphasis on the fact that venue was proper under section 12 of the Clayton
Act and that the purpose of the section was to make it easier for private
plaintiffs to sue for antitrust violations. 22 It thus seems likely that when a
plaintiff lays venue in accordance with section 12, the court will not easily
disturb the plaintiffs choice.
113. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
114. 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3847 (3d ed. 2007).
115. Id. at n.13; see also Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift on an Uncharted Sea": A
Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612 (1992).
116. See 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 114.
117. Id. § 3849.
118. Id. § 3847.
119. 278 F. Supp. 839 (D. Haw. 1967).
120. Id. at 843. See generally Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under
Forum Non Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S. C.A. §14049a), 1 A.L.R. Fed.
15, § 31 [a]-[b] (2006) (listing and discussing antitrust actions where § 1404(a) motions have
been granted and denied).
121. L.C. O'Neil, 278 F. Supp. at 842-43.
122. Id. at 843.
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b. Venue in Private Antitrust Actions Under Section 12
i. Interaction Between Specific and Traditional Venue Statutes
In the past, it was unclear how the general venue statutes discussed above
would interact with the many specific venue statutes attached to individual
substantive laws, such as section 12 of the Clayton Act. However, in Pure
Oil Co. v. Suarez,123 writing in the context of the Jones Act, the Supreme
Court held that in the absence of contrary provisions in the law itself, a
statute's specific venue provision is supplementary and does not displace
the general venue provisions. 124 Section 12 of the Clayton Act does not
have any contrary restrictions and "it is now clear beyond any doubt that the
general venue statutes apply to antitrust cases." 125
In Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,126 the
Supreme Court has also held that § 139 1(d) is not "a venue restriction at all,
but rather a declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens
are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and
special."' 127 In Brunette, the Court held that venue over an alien defendant
being sued for patent violations was proper under § 1391(d) and was not
limited by either the specific venue provision that governs patent
infringement law or the other venue provisions of § 1391.128
ii. Venue Under Section 12 of the Clayton Act in
Private Antitrust Litigation
The text of section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for proper venue in
three situations: (1) in any judicial district where the defendant corporation
is an inhabitant, (2) in any judicial district where it may be found, or (3) in
any judicial district where it transacts business. 129 However, these three
situations boil down to a single test, the "transacts business" test.
123. 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
124. Id. at 204-05.
125. See 14D Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 114, § 3818. It is critical to recognize
that this is not the same as holding that the general statutes may broaden section 12's venue
provision. This is what the controversy in this Note is about, whether the general statutes
broaden section 12's venue provision or apply only as an alternative source of venue. If a
court reads the general and the specific provisions together, a plaintiff could always invoke
section 12's service of process clause. If the general venue provisions do not broaden
section 12's venue provision, a plaintiff may only invoke section 12's service of process
provision if venue is satisfied through section 12.
126. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
127. Id. at 714. Although at first glance this statement might seem to end the inquiry, this
holding does not definitively settle the section 12 issue as to alien defendants. There is no
question that § 1391(d) applies in antitrust suits against corporate alien defendants; the
question is, when venue is satisfied according to § 1391(d), as opposed to section 12,
whether a plaintiff may establish personal jurisdiction under section 12, or whether he must
establish personal jurisdiction by the traditional means.
128. Id.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
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A corporation is an "inhabitant" of the state of its incorporation, 130 "may
be found" in a district where it is doing business, 131 and can "do business"
in a district besides that of its incorporation. 132 The Supreme Court has
held that the transacts business language in section 12 presents a lower bar
than "may be found," and stated that to hold otherwise would "defeat the
plain purpose of th[e] section."'133 Under this interpretation, "may be
found" provides no additional basis for venue because it requires greater
contacts than transacting business, which section 12 authorizes as an
acceptable basis for venue. Transacting business looks at the same
contacts, but sets a lower bar; therefore, the higher bar is largely irrelevant.
In Daniel, the Second Circuit summarized the transacts business test for
section 12, referring to the Supreme Court's definition of transacting
business in United States v. Scophony Corp. :134
[T]he determination whether a defendant transact[s] business in a district
depend[s] on a realistic assessment of the nature of the defendant's
business and of whether its contacts with the venue district [can] fairly be
said to evidence the "practical, everyday business or commercial concept
of doing business or carrying on business of any substantial character." 135
The transacts business test is a fact-specific inquiry. It is best understood
through comparison of fact patterns in which courts concluded that a
corporate defendant transacted business for section 12 purposes with fact
patterns in which courts concluded that a corporate defendant did not
transact business for section 12 purposes. In Daniel, the Second Circuit
provided many such examples.
A manufacturer transacts business in a district by doing the following in
that district: promoting its goods, offering product demonstrations, utilizing
salesmen who solicit orders, and shipping goods there. 136 A corporation
that accredits institutions transacts business in a district if it conducts local
inspections in the district as part of the accreditation procedure. 37 A
professional organization that enforces its standards by direct and continual
130. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
131. See Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 532 (N.D. Tex.
2001). Note that "found" for venue purposes is different than "found" for service of process.
The latter provides for worldwide service of process while the former establishes venue
wherever a corporation is "doing business." See supra Part I.B.2.b.ii.
132. Furthermore, wherever a corporation is incorporated, it will be subject to general
personal jurisdiction and section 12 will not be necessary to establish specific personal
jurisdiction.
133. Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 374 (1927).
134. 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948).
135. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 429 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Scophony, 333 U.S. at 807).
136. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 373-74).
137. Id. (citing Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515, 517-18
(D.C. Cir. 1966)).
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supervision of its members in the district transacts business in the
district. 138
By contrast, an association does not transact business in a district if some
of its members reside in the district and the association advertises and
transmits professional materials in the district, 139 but "there [are] no offices,
no officers, no agents, no property, no purchases, no seminars or
workshops, and no sales save of pamphlets, journals, and other educational
and public relations materials generating very little revenue" in the
district. 140 A professional organization does not transact business in a
district by advertising and conducting programs in the district for members
who reside in the district.141
iii. Distinctions-or Lack Thereof-Between
General Venue and Section 12 Venue
In 1914, Congress enacted section 12 to expand the bounds of venue for
private antitrust litigation.142 However, commentators today largely accept
that the general venue provisions have expanded outward to about the same
point as section 12.143 Whether section 12's venue provision is equal to,
more restrictive than, or more liberal than § 1391(b) does not affect the
section 12 issue to the degree one might expect. Section 12 and § 1391(b)
138. Id. (citing Myers v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 730 (3d Cir. 1983)).
139. Id. (citing Bartholomew v. Va. Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir.
1979), abrogated on other grounds by Bartholomew v. Va. Chiropractors Ass'n, 446 U.S.
938 (1980)).
140. Bartholomew, 612 F.2d at 816.
141. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 429 (citing Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
F.2d 426, 436-38 (5th Cir. 1977)).
142. Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372 (1927).
143. See 14D Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 114, § 3818 ("[T]he very broad
reading of 'transacts business' made it rarely if ever necessary to supplement Section 12 by
resort to the 'claim arose' provision of Section 1391(b)."); see also Daniel J. Capra,
Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an International Antitrust Case: Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue, 9 Fordham Int'l L.J. 401, 476 (1986) ("In sum, as to corporate
defendants, section 1391(b) provides no forum not already provided by Section 12 of the
Clayton Act."); Jordan G. Lee, Note, Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When Can Worldwide
Service of Process Allow Suit in Any District?, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 673, 695 (2004) (mentioning
§ 1391 as broader than section 12 as a result of amendments to the general provisions). One
possible situation where section 12 venue would be easier to satisfy than § 1391(b) and in
turn make bringing suit easier for a private plaintiff would be where a corporate defendant
meets section 12's "transacts business" test in a district where the claim did not arise.
Suppose Widget Corporation, a Delaware corporation, has its headquarters in California, and
has a regional office in New York. Now imagine that Widget has undertaken acts in
California that violated the antitrust laws and caused injury across the country. A private
plaintiff could sue Widget in New York because maintenance of the regional office would
likely satisfy the "transacts business" test for section 12 venue, and therefore could establish
personal jurisdiction in the district by utilizing section 12's worldwide service provision. See
supra Part I.B.3.b.ii. Without section 12, a private plaintiff could not sue Widget in New
York because the company's contacts in New York are not so great to expose it to general




provide that venue is proper in a limited number of locations for each case
brought against a domestic defendant. Section 1391(d) provides that venue
is proper in any district for a case brought against an alien defendant. The
issue is illusory to the extent that when § 1391(b) is satisfied, section 12
venue is likely satisfied as well and the plaintiff may invoke section 12's
service of process provision. However, the question remains whether
courts may read section 12 in conjunction with § 1391-the so-called broad
reading-to eviscerate the venue inquiry and allow any corporate antitrust
defendant to be sued in any district in the same manner as an alien
defendant may typically be sued. The issue also remains whether a private
plaintiff must satisfy section 12's venue provision to be able to utilize the
worldwide service of process provision to serve an alien defendant, or if the
plaintiff may always use the service of process provision because venue is
always proper though § 1391 (d).
II. SECTION 12 OF THE CLAYTON ACT:
THE INTEGRATED READING VERSUS THE BROAD READING
The section 12 issue currently dividing the nation's circuit courts rests on
how a trial court interprets the section when a private party sues a corporate
defendant for antitrust violations. There are two possible readings of
section 12. One reading, which this Note refers to as the "integrated
reading" of section 12, requires that venue first be satisfied pursuant to
section 12's venue provision in order to utilize the liberal worldwide service
of process provision of section 12.144 Under the integrated reading, if
venue is satisfied under section 12's venue provision, the plaintiff need only
establish that the defendant has minimum aggregate contacts with the
nation as required by the Fifth Amendment to obtain personal jurisdiction.
Under the integrated reading, a plaintiff that cannot establish venue
according to section 12's venue provision cannot utilize section 12 to serve
process on the defendant. The plaintiff would have to lay venue in a proper
district according to the general venue provision, § 1391, and establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant through the state long-arm statute
pursuant to Federal Rule 4(k)(1)(A) and within the bounds of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Invoking the state long-arm statute will
likely require the court to assess whether the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state to provide personal jurisdiction over
the defendant in the forum.
The other possible reading, which this Note refers to as the "broad
reading" of section 12, allows the plaintiff to utilize the liberal worldwide
service of process provision and then establish venue through either § 1391
or section 12. Under this reading, personal jurisdiction is established when
144. See, e.g., Daniel, 428 F.3d at 428 ("[B]ecause plaintiffs cannot establish venue in the
Western District of New York under Section 12, they cannot avail themselves of that
statute's worldwide service of process provision to establish personal jurisdiction in that
district.").
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the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the nation as a whole.
Once personal jurisdiction is proven, venue may then be established
through § 1391(b) and (c) 145 for domestic defendants or through §
1391(d) 146 for alien defendants. Under this reading, the result is that venue
is proper in any district in the country both for domestic and foreign
corporate defendants, the former because personal jurisdiction establishes
venue and the latter because of their exemption from venue.
Invariably, the litigants in the cases discussed below fought over whether
the plaintiff could utilize the worldwide service of process provision of
section 12 to establish personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs prefer simply to
prove that the corporate defendant has minimum contacts with the nation as
a whole to establish personal jurisdiction in the court of plaintiff's choosing
rather than to prove that the defendant's conduct satisfies the long-arm
statute of the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
especially prefer the broad reading when suing domestic defendants
because it relieves them of having to prove proper venue. This part of the
Note further explains the conflict by discussing and analyzing cases where
the section 12 issue arises.
A. Integrated or Narrow Reading of Section 12
1. Case Law and Rationale
In 1961, in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,147 the Second Circuit noted in
dicta that "the extraterritorial service privilege is given only when the
[venue] requirements [of section 12] are satisfied."' 48 The court did not
indicate that it recognized the possibility of a different reading of section
12. While both the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit point to this case in
holding that section 12 applies as an integrated whole, it is weak precedent
because the interpretation of section 12 in Goldlawr was not necessary to
the court's holding, and the court did not explain why section 12 should be
read as an integrated whole.
Those cases in which the reading of section 12 was dispositive and where
the court acknowledged that there are two possible readings of section 12
are more instructive. In GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth
145. See, e.g., Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375, 382 (W.D.
La. 1996) (holding that defendant corporations who did not transact business, own property
in, or have any significant contacts with Louisiana, were subject to personal jurisdiction
under section 12 of the Clayton Act and that venue was therefore proper in the district
pursuant to § 139 1(b) and (c)).
146. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that personal jurisdiction was proper based on section 12's worldwide service of
process provision and that venue was proper in the District of Arizona based on § 1391(d)
without a showing of sufficient contacts with the forum, only with the nation).
147. 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
148. Id. at 581.
2007] 1199
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Corp.,149 decided by the D.C. Circuit in 2000, the issues presented were
"whether the District Court [could properly] assert personal jurisdiction
over the defendants and whether venue [wa]s proper in the [district] when
the defendants' sole contact with th[e] forum [wa]s the operation of Internet
websites ... accessible to persons in the District." 150 The plaintiff alleged a
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming that the
defendants colluded to monopolize the online business directories
market. 151 The defendants, multiple regional operating companies, had
allegedly met and conspired in other states and had no contacts with the
District of Columbia besides the operation of web sites accessible in the
district. 152 The plaintiff argued that the operation of the web sites was
enough to support personal jurisdiction under the district's long-arm statute
and argued, in the alternative, that section 12 provided an independent basis
for personal jurisdiction over the defendants.153
The D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that the defendants'
operation of web sites accessible in the forum supplied the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum. 154 It then turned to the plaintiff's
section 12 argument. 155 The circuit court noted that the plaintiff did not
establish that the defendants were inhabitants of the district, could be found
in the district, or transacted business in the district as required by section
12's venue provision. 156 The plaintiff argued that it was not necessary to
satisfy section 12's first clause in order to take advantage of the second
clause, which both parties agreed confers nationwide jurisdiction. 157 The
court recognized the desire to view section 12's venue provision
expansively, but commented that this desire does not justify disregarding
entirely the venue clause. 158  The court continued, "[I]t seems quite
unreasonable to presume that Congress would intentionally craft a two-
pronged provision with a superfluous first clause, ostensibly link the two
provisions with the 'in such cases' language, but nonetheless fail to indicate
clearly anywhere that it intended the first clause to be disposable."' 159 The
court went on to hold that "[a] party seeking to take advantage of section
12's liberalized service provisions must follow the dictates of both of its
clauses. To read the statute otherwise would be to ignore its plain
meaning."' 60 Because the plaintiff had not proven that the defendants met
any of the criteria for venue under section 12, the court held that the
149. 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
150. Id. at 1345.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1346.
153. Id. at 1345, 1350-51.
154. Id. at 1349.
155. Id. at 1350.
156. Id. at 1351.
157. Id. at 1350.
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plaintiff could not establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants under
section 12.161
In the following year, in Management Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enterprises,
Inc.,162 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas sua sponte
raised the issue of whether section 12 allowed the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over an Indiana defendant in Texas by a Texas plaintiff.163
Both parties to the litigation were competitors in the market for providing
tax services to Fortune 1000 companies. 164 At issue in the litigation was
the plaintiffs allegation that defendant placed a phone call to one of the
plaintiffs customers in Tennessee and informed the customer that the
plaintiff was discontinuing a service, presumably one that the defendant
told the customer it could provide. 165  If true, the plaintiffs allegation
amounted to a Sherman Act violation. 166 The defendant moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it had no contacts with Texas,
and that venue was improper in the Northern District of Texas. 167 The
court first held there were insufficient contacts to support personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on the traditional forum contacts
analysis. 168
The court next considered whether section 12 of the Clayton Act allowed
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, at least as to the
alleged antitrust law violations. 169 The court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's
reading of section 12, and found that an integrated reading was more
reasonable in light of the statute's structure and wording, explaining that
"the alternate reading leads to nonsensical results.' 170 The court was
specifically concerned with what would happen if it combined section 12's
worldwide service of process provision with § 1391 (c) of the general venue
provision rather than reading section 12 as an integrated whole. The court
noted that combining § 1391(c) and a broad reading of section 12
"completely eviscerates any semblance of a venue inquiry in antitrust cases
involving corporate defendants-a result this Court finds Congress could
not have intended."' 171 The court's incredulity continued:
[A]llow[ing] a national contacts personal jurisdiction analysis if venue is
proper under section 12 or § 1391, coupled with § 1391(c)'s provision
that venue is proper for corporate defendants as long as personal
jurisdiction exists in a particular district, requires a court's inquiry into
161. Id. The circuit court remanded the case for further jurisdictional discovery to give
the plaintiff the opportunity to supplement its jurisdictional allegations. Id. at 1351-52.
162. 194 F. Supp. 2d 520 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
163. Id. at 521,530.
164. Id. at 521.
165. Id. at 522.
166. Id. at 521.
167. Id. at 522.
168. Id. at 527-30.
169. Id. at 530.




venue and [personal] jurisdiction in antitrust cases to become indisputably
circular and monolithic .... If the defendant is a domestic corporation, the
[broad reading], in conjunction with § 1391(c), allows a plaintiff to sue a
defendant in any district, even if that district has absolutely no relation to
that defendant's business or to the incident that prompted the suit.
172
The court thus concluded that it could not permit a nationwide contacts
analysis under section 12 unless the plaintiff had established proper venue
under section 12's venue provision. 173 The court found that plaintiff did
not establish that defendant satisfied section 12's venue provision in the
Northern District of Texas and granted defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. 74
Against this background, in Daniel,175 the Second Circuit endorsed the
integrated reading of section 12.176 The plaintiff-class of licensed
physicians sued two defendants 177 incorporated in Michigan and nine
hospitals, none of which were New York corporations or had their principal
place of business in New York. 178 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
"colluded to restrain trade in connection with the practice of emergency
medicine . . . and to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the market
for... certified and-eligible [emergency] doctors."' 79 The district court
held that the Clayton Act afforded personal jurisdiction over the defendant-
appellees, but dismissed the plaintiffs claim for lack of standing.' 80 The
172. Id. at 532.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 532-33. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has also recognized that a combination
of a national contacts analysis with the general venue statute could produce unfair results for
some defendants, especially alien defendants. For example, alien defendants could be
incorporated in Europe, do business only in New York, and be sued in California where a
plaintiff could obtain both venue and personal jurisdiction. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A
Policy Analysis, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 485, 509 (1982). The possibility of such unfair results led
Hovenkamp to advocate that "[a] better approach is to interpret section 12 the way it is
written. Worldwide service is proper only when the action is brought in the district where
the defendant resides, is found, or transacts business." Id. Hovenkamp believes that "the
plaintiff who steps outside of section 12 to establish venue must also lose the benefit of
section 12 for obtaining service of process. The plaintiff must then rely on the long-arm
statute of the forum state." Id. Professors Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, and Edward
Cooper agree with Professor Hovenkamp. They also believe section 12 should be
interpreted "the way it is written." See 14D Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 114, §
3818. Wright, Miller, and Cooper support the integrated reading because the broad reading
allows a court to combine § 1391(c) and (b) to establish venue in conjunction with personal
jurisdiction under section 12, a result which they believe to be "circular." Id.
175. 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).
176. Id. at 423.
177. One of the corporate defendants, the American Board of Emergency Medicine, did
not contest personal jurisdiction at the district court level and did not appeal a finding of
personal jurisdiction over it. Id. at 421.
178. Id. at 415-17.
179. Id. at 414.
180. The plaintiffs lacked standing when the case reached the circuit court. Despite the
plaintiffs' lack of standing, the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
This occurred because the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
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plaintiffs appealed from the lower court's dismissal for lack of antitrust
standing. On appeal, the defendants argued alternatively that they were not
subject to personal jurisdiction and venue in the Western District of New
York. 181 The Second Circuit acknowledged the circuit split regarding the
interpretation of section 12 of the Clayton Act and elected to join the D.C.
Circuit in holding that "the plain language of Section 12 indicates that its
service of process provision applies (and, therefore, establishes personal
jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue provision is satisfied.' ' 182
The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 183 in which the Supreme Court stated, "The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole."' 84 The Second Circuit took this to mean
that "[i]f the meaning is plain, we inquire no further." 185 Looking to the
text of section 12, the court then focused on the common meaning of the
word "such," which Congress placed after the semicolon in section 12. The
court found that "such" means "having a quality already or just specified;...
of the sort or degree previously indicated or implied; or previously
characterized or described."' 186 Applying this common meaning to the text,
the court found it obvious that,
improper venue in the Western District of New York. The magistrate judge recommended
that the district court deny the motion based on a broad reading of section 12 (combining §
1391(c) and (b) to establish venue and utilizing section 12 to establish personal jurisdiction).
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127
(W.D.N.Y. 1997). In 2000, the plaintiffs filed a seconded amended complaint. In 2003, the
magistrate judge, on a motion to dismiss by the defendants, recommended that the second
amended complaint be dismissed, inter alia, for lack of antitrust standing. The district court
again adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and dismissed the thirteen-
year-old case. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 269 F. Supp. 2d 159 (W.D.N.Y.
2003). The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit and the defendants argued
that dismissal was proper "not only for lack of antitrust standing but also for lack of personal
jurisdiction and venue in the Western District of New York." Daniel, 428 F.3d at 414. The
court of appeals chose to interpret section 12 of the Clayton Act because the district court
had based personal jurisdiction for all corporate defendants on section 12 while basing venue
on the general venue provisions for some defendants and section 12 for other defendants. Id.
at 421-35. Notably, the court concluded that venue was improper in the Western District of
New York and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants after
thirteen years of litigation in that district. Id. at 435. The plaintiffs initiated suit in 1990; the
case was dismissed in 2003. See Docket, Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 269 F.
Supp. 2d 159 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (1:90-CV-01086). That litigation can ensue for thirteen
years at the district court level in a forum that lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants
is a good reason for Congress or the Supreme Court to settle the conflict, if only to prevent
the waste of scarce judicial resources.
181. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 414.
182. Id. at 423.
183. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
184. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 423 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[t]he "quality" of the cases specified in the provision of Section 12
preceding the semicolon is not simply that they are antitrust cases ... it is
that they are antitrust cases against corporations brought in the particular
venues approved by Section 12 .... It is "in such cases,".., that Section
12 makes worldwide service of process available. 187
The court next pointed out that its construction of section 12 comported
with the Supreme Court's 1927 opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. of New York
v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 188 In Kodak, the Supreme Court noted
that section 12 expanded venue by allowing suit in a district where the
defendant transacts business, even when the defendant does not reside there,
or can be found there. 189 The Court, after discussing where venue may be
laid under section 12, then linked its discussion of venue to service of
process, stating, "[In which case the process may be issued to and served
in a district [where] the corporation ... is 'found."' 1 90 The Daniel court
noted that the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "in which case" to link the
discussion of venue and service of process suggested that the Court
understood the service of process provision to be available only when venue
was satisfied under the statute. 19 1
The Daniel court found that the inquiry could stop there because section
12's meaning was ascertainable from its plain language. Nevertheless, the
court considered the position of those circuit courts that read section 12
broadly.1 92 Daniel acknowledged that the main purpose of section 12 was
the "expansion of the bounds of venue," but that the legislative history on
section 12 was sparse. 193 The court specifically referred to United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., where the Supreme Court remarked that "[i]n
adopting section 12 Congress was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to
haul defendants hither and yon at their caprice."' 94 Absent evidence of
Congress's purpose in enacting a venue and service of process provision in
a single sentence, the court concluded there is no reason to find that
Congress desired to divorce the two "provisions [and] combine the latter
with an expanded general venue statute enacted decades later."' 195
Essentially, the court in Daniel observed that Congress adopted section 12
to expand venue for antitrust actions in light of restrictive general venue
provisions, but today, § 1391 has caught up. Thus, the Daniel court found
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372-
73 (1927)).
189. Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 372-76.
190. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 424 (citing Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 372-73).
191. Id. The Kodak language is not dispositive of the section 12 issue today because
section 12 expanded the bounds of venue when it was enacted; the issue presented in this
Note did not exist until the ordinary venue provisions were liberalized. See infra note 290
and accompanying text.
192. Id. at 425.
193. Id. (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989)).
194. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948), superseded in part
by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2002) (transfer of venue).
195. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 425.
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that the elimination of section 12's liberalizing effect does not justify
creatively reading section 12 with § 1391(b) and (c). To do so in order to
further liberalize section 12's antitrust venue beyond Congress's original
intent would eviscerate the venue inquiry entirely.
The court next compared the Clayton Act's expanded venue provision
and service of process provision to similar provisions in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 196 The Second Circuit recognized that it "must
proceed cautiously in drawing . . . analogies" between different statutes'
special venue provisions because, in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Construction Co., the Supreme Court stated that "analysis of special venue
provisions must be specific to the statute." 197 As compared to courts that
read section 12 broadly, 198 the Second Circuit further recognized that all
three provisions contain different statutory text, and found that such a
comparison is relatively useless. 199
Although the Second Circuit found a comparison of section 12 and
section 78aa of the '34 Act 200 to be unhelpful, 20 1 Daniel found support for
196. Id. at 426. The district court relied on such comparisons in reaching the conclusion
that section 12 is properly read broadly. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 204
(2000)).
198. See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
199. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 426.
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) (originally enacted as Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ch. 404, tit. 1, § 27, 48 Stat. 902). Section 78aa, titled "Jurisdiction of offenses and suits,"
reads in pertinent part,
Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to
enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in
any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
Id.
201. Specifically, the court noted that the venue and service of process provision of the
'34 Act was intended "to extend personal jurisdiction to the full reach permitted by the due
process clause" and that it was doubtful that a situation would arise where venue would be
improper under the provision. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 427 (quoting Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972)). However, as applied, section
12 of the Clayton Act extends personal jurisdiction to the full reach permitted by due
process. It is unclear how Congress's intent to extend personal jurisdiction as far as due
process allows indicates Congress's intent that venue ought to be bootstrapped to personal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Second Circuit's statement that the text and structure of the
'34 Act "differ[s] in important respects from the Clayton Act" is inaccurate. Id. at 426. The
relevant provision of the '34 Act states that suit may be brought in any district where the
violation occurred "or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(emphasis added to indicate similarity to section 12 of the Clayton Act). This language is
very similar regarding venue and nearly identical regarding service of process to the
language of section 12. Delivering the opinion of the court for the Second Circuit, Judge
Henry Friendly noted in 1972 that § 78aa is "[a] rather ineptly worded provision[,] ... [that]
2007] 1205
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
its conclusion that section 12 should be read as an integrated whole by
comparing section 12 with the venue and personal jurisdiction provisions of
RICO. The Clayton Act served as a model for the venue and personal
jurisdiction provisions of RICO. 20 2 There, Congress elected to separate the
venue and service of process provisions into two separate lettered
subsections. 20 3 Title 18, § 1965(a) provides where the action may be
brought (venue); § 1965(d) provides for worldwide service of process "in
any action or proceeding under this chapter." 204 In contrast to section 12,
the latter RICO section does not contain a limiting "in such cases" clause,
making it clear that Congress intended § 1965(d) to apply to all cases
brought under RICO, in which venue is established under § 1965(a). 20 5 The
Daniel court noted that section 12 served as a model for RICO's § 1965 and
concluded that Congress's decision to separate venue and service of process
into separate lettered sections indicated its intent to differentiate RICO's
long-arm statute from the Clayton Act's long-arm statute. 20 6 The court
found the language and structural differences between the Clayton Act and
RICO to reinforce the conclusion that "Congress was expressly rendering
independent under RICO concepts that it had plainly linked under Clayton
Act Section 12."207
2. Impact on Private Antitrust Litigation
An integrated reading of section 12 requires an antitrust plaintiff to lay
venue in a district where the defendant transacts business20 8 in order to take
advantage of the worldwide service of process provision. In contrast with
the broad reading of section 12, which permits suit in any district in the
country so long as the defendant (either domestic or foreign) has sufficient
minimum contacts with the nation, an integrated reading's main impact on
private antitrust litigation is that it prevents the maintenance of suit under
section 12 in districts where the defendant has insufficient contacts.
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp noted, "[W]hen an antitrust action is brought
in a proper venue under section 12 of the Clayton Act, then the defendant is
likely to have the requisite minimum contacts with the state to satisfy the
requirements of International Shoe."'209
appear[s] to have been modeled on [section] 12 of the Clayton Act." Leasco Data
Processing, 468 F.2d at 1340 n. 10.
202. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 427 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), (d) (2000)).
203. Id.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1965.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), (d); see Daniel, 428 F.3d at 427.
206. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 427.
207. Id.
208. See supra Part I.B.3.b.ii.
209. Hovenkamp, supra note 174, at 508 (citing Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)). Hovenkamp refers to a district court decision where the court concluded,
It is clear that once it has been determined that a defendant has transacted business
in the particular district involved within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 22 and is
therefore subject to venue under the antitrust laws, his activities qualifying as
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Therefore, an integrated reading of section 12 ensures that a private
plaintiff cannot force a corporate antitrust defendant to defend in a district
in which it has no contacts. This seems to negate any advantage that a
plaintiff could gain from section 12's worldwide service of process clause.
If the defendant's contacts are good enough for section 12 venue and are
therefore likely good enough for personal jurisdiction through an
International Shoe minimum contacts analysis, it remains unclear whether
there is anything actually left of section 12 besides the venue provision.
This begs the question because it is unclear how a situation might arise
where section 12 venue is satisfied, but § 1391(b) is not. Thus, although a
common criticism of the broad reading of section 12 is that it eliminates
section 12's venue provision, it seems that an integrated reading of section
12 might, at most, add little to the modem general venue provisions and
ordinary personal jurisdiction analysis today. Consequently, the issue is
whether this is an acceptable application of section 12.
B. Broad Reading of Section 12
The broad reading of section 12 of the Clayton Act allows a plaintiff to
utilize section 12's worldwide service of process provision to serve process
on a defendant corporation no matter how venue is established. This can
result in a situation where venue is proper in any district in the country,
even if the defendant has no contacts with the district where suit is brought.
This occurs when courts allow a plaintiff to first establish personal
jurisdiction under section 12 and then to establish proper venue through §
1391(b) and (c), for domestic defendants, or through § 1391(d), for alien
defendants.
1. Case Law and Rationale
a. Personal Jurisdiction Under Section 12 and Venue
Under § 1391(d) for Alien Defendants
In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
heard General Electric Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,210 a case brought against a
foreign corporation for violations of the antitrust laws.211 The plaintiff
alleged that a British corporation restrained trade in the United States by
transacting business under [section 12] likewise fully satisfy the Constitutional due
process test of 'minimum contacts,' as announced [in] International Shoe.
Id. at 508 n. 118 (quoting Smokey's of Tulsa, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 453 F. Supp.
1265, 1267 (E.D. Okla. 1978)). Recognize that International Shoe was twenty-six years
removed when Congress enacted section 12 in 1914. Therefore, although today it seems
likely that when section 12 venue is satisfied that personal jurisdiction is also established by
way of the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state, in 1914 contacts were not a
substitute for presence under Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and section 12 made
serving valid process substantially easier.
210. 550 F.Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
211. Id. at 1038.
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actions taken abroad. 212 The foreign defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and improper service of
process. 213  There were two issues presented: (1) whether § 1391(d)
supplements section 12, and if so, (2) whether reliance on § 1391(d) to
establish venue renders section 12's worldwide service of process provision
unavailable. 214 It was necessary for the court to decide whether the plaintiff
could utilize section 12's service of process provision without establishing
venue under section 12 because it was unclear whether the alien defendant
fell within section 12's venue provision.215
The court distinguished Goldlawr, a Second Circuit case that read section
12 as an integrated whole,216 on the grounds that it "did not discuss the
applicability of section 1391(d) or any other general venue provision to the
question of service and personal jurisdiction under section 12."217 The
court read Goldlawr to require venue to be proper based on either section
12 or § 1391 in order for plaintiffs to be able to take advantage of section
12's worldwide service of process clause. 218 In Bucyrus-Erie, the court
applied § 1391(d) to the alien defendant and then permitted section 12 to
establish personal jurisdiction.219
The Bucyrus-Erie court did not ignore the canons of statutory
interpretation, but found that the "usual rules of syntax" supported a broad
reading of section 12.220 Referring to the phrase "in such cases" in the
service of process provision of section 12, the court defined "such" as
meaning "aforementioned."' 221 The court went on to explain that "when
'such' precedes a noun it is assumed to refer to a particular antecedent noun
and any dependent adjective or adjectival clauses modifying that noun, but
not to any other part of the preceding clause or sentence. '222 The noun
following "such" in section 12 is "cases. ' 223 The antecedent noun that
"such" refers to is therefore "any suit . . . arising under the antitrust laws
against a corporation" from section 12's venue provision.224 The court
212. Id. at 1043. The court did not discuss whether the United States' antitrust laws
applied to the defendant's conduct, presumably because the defendant did not raise the issue
on the motion to dismiss. The defendant exported millions of dollars worth of machines to
the United States, executed contracts within the United States, and held U.S. patents. The
court determined that these contacts were sufficient with the nation as a whole to establish
personal jurisdiction within Fifth Amendment due process limits. See id. at 1044. See supra
Part I.B. 1 .b for a discussion of the extraterritorial application of federal antitrust law.
213. Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1038.
214. Id. For reasons discussed in Part I.B.3.b.i, the court concluded that § 1391(d) was
supplemental to the venue provision in section 12. See id. at 1038-43.
215. Id. at 1039.
216. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
217. Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1041.
218. Id. at 1042.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1042 n.7.
222. Id.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
224. Id.
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concluded that "in such cases" refers only to "'any suit . . .under the
antitrust laws against a corporation;' and not to anything else in section 12's
first clause." 225
The court recognized the problem created by its holding, specifically that
"a plaintiff could get jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in 'any district'
...even if the corporation had never had contacts with this country." 226
The court resolved this problem by holding that section 12 permits personal
jurisdiction to stretch only as far as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment allows, that is, to a minimum contacts analysis with the United
States as a whole. 227 In Bucyrus-Erie, the defendant's contacts with the
United States consisted of regular exportation of millions of dollars worth
of machines and spare parts manufactured abroad to the United States,
executing contracts within the United States, adopting a U.S. corporate seal,
holding U.S. patents that it had licensed to U.S. corporations, and
purchasing electrical equipment and diesel engines through U.S. purchasing
agents. 228 The court concluded that the defendant's contacts with the
United States "evince[d] a desire by [the defendant] to avail itself of the
'privileges and benefits' of United States law such that 'it has clear notice
that it is subject to suit there."' 229 The court held that personal jurisdiction
and venue were proper in the Southern District of New York without
mentioning whether the defendant had any contacts with the forum.230
Seven years after Bucyrus-Erie, the Ninth Circuit heard Go- Video, Inc. v.
Akai Electric Co.,231 the case that stands for the broad reading of section
12.232 Go-Video, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Arizona, brought suit in the District of Arizona against a
Japanese electronics trade association made up of multiple Japanese
manufacturing companies for alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.233 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants refused to deal with Go-
Video, which prevented it from manufacturing its patented "dual deck"
videocassette recorder. 234 Plaintiff claimed venue was proper in Arizona
under § 1391(d) and served process on the Japanese defendants pursuant to
section 12.235 The district court found that personal jurisdiction and venue
were proper in the District of Arizona based on a combination of the two
225. Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1042 n.7.
226. Id. at 1042-43.
227. Id. at 1043.
228. Id. at 1044.
229. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 297
(1980)).
230. Id.
231. 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1407.
234. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the Japanese defendants conspired with domestic movie
companies and a movie trade association to prevent Go-Video from marketing the "dual
deck" videocassette recorder in the United States. Id.
235. Id. at 1407-08.
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statutes and the defendant's aggregate contacts with the nation. 236 The
defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.237
The defendants argued that section 12 ought to be read as an integrated
whole, while the plaintiff argued that "such cases" referred to all antitrust
cases against a corporation,- not only those in which venue was laid
according to the venue provision of section 12.238 The court observed that
the answer was not clear from the plain language of the statute, but
concluded that the purpose of private antitrust enforcement supported the
adoption of the broad reading of section 12.239
The court in Go- Video first found that a broad reading, as compared to an
integrated reading, of section 12 was appropriate because "it is more closely
in keeping with the manner in which courts have traditionally defined the
relationship between one statute's specific venue provision and the general
federal venue statutes." 240 The court focused on the settled rule of law that
specific venue provisions supplement general venue provisions and thus
held that venue may properly be satisfied under either provision.241
In addition, the court concluded that the history and purpose of the
antitrust laws support a broad reading of section 12.242 The court noted that
there is little legislative history illuminating how Congress intended the two
provisions of section 12 to interact.243 Looking to the legislative history,
the court observed that the venue provision was introduced in the House
with the purpose of allowing antitrust suit against a corporate defendant
wherever it could be found; the Senate added the service provision without
debate or objection, and specifically without indication that it was intended
to "be subject[] to the section's venue provision." 244
The Go-Video court focused on its understanding that section 12 had
been adopted to "expan[d] the bounds of venue" and therefore was
"reluctant to adopt a construction of section 12 which would, by limiting
the availability of the valued tool of worldwide service of process, recast its
venue provision as restrictive, rather than a broadening, provision and
might prevent plaintiffs from pursuing legitimate [antitrust] claims. ' 245 The
court's determination of the purpose of section 12 guided its statutory
construction as well. The court applied the canon reddendo singula
singulis, which applies when unclear "antecedents and consequents are
[interpreted] by reference to the context and purpose of the statute as a





241. Id. at 1408-10; see also supra Part I.B.3.b.i. Note that even courts that adopt an
integrated reading of section 12 agree that this is correct; however, to rely on this agreement
in order to settle the conflict confuses the issue.
242. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1408.
243. Id. at 1410.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1410-11.
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whole." 246 The court concluded that the broad reading "is clearly the one
more consonant with the purpose of the Clayton Act and better comports
with a section designed to expand the reach of the antitrust laws and make it
easier for plaintiffs to sue for antitrust violations." 247
Having determined that venue was proper over the Japanese defendants
under § 1391(d), the court upheld personal jurisdiction based on the trade
association's contacts with the United States as a whole pursuant to section
12's worldwide service of process provision.248 The defendants argued that
it was unfair to require a foreign defendant to litigate in any district in the
country based on a national contacts analysis. The court responded that a
motion to transfer pursuant to the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), could handle any issue of unfairness since an unfair forum is not
necessarily a jurisdictionally defective forum.249 The defendants had not
moved for a transfer, so the court did not consider whether the facts
warranted a change of venue. 250
In 2004, the Third Circuit faced the section 12 issue in a suit brought
against an alien corporation, and it too held that service of process under
section 12 does not depend on venue being established under section 12.251
In In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation,252 the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated sixty-three actions
filed in five states for pretrial purposes in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 253 The class action complaint alleged that over the course of
seven years, multiple foreign and domestic defendants conspired to fix
prices of automotive refinish paint in the United States.254 The district
court found personal jurisdiction over the alien defendants pursuant to
246. Id. at 1412.
247. Id. at 1413 (citing United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 806-08 (1948));
see also Lee, supra note 143, at 689. Jordan Lee argues that because the purpose of the
antitrust laws is to protect competition throughout the nation, public policy supports "broad
antitrust enforcement." Id. Lee points out that the conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws
can result in "large-scale economic impact" making "broad venue and service powers useful
in enforcing the [antitrust] laws." Id. Lee's argument applies to both alien and domestic
defendants.
248. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1414-16.
249. Id. at 1416-17. Professor Capra agrees that fear of unfairness to alien defendants is
not a good reason to read section 12 as an integrated whole. See Capra, supra note 143, at
409-11. Capra argues that "[a]ny concern about protecting alien defendants from
overreaching and substantial inconvenience is answered by the protections afforded by the
due process clause, and more importantly by the transfer of venue provision." Id. at 409.
Capra further argues that allowing the section 12 service of process provision to be used with
§ 1391(d) simply makes things easier by avoiding the difficulties and uncertainties
associated with the "transacts business" venue test in section 12. Id. But see supra note 174
(discussing Hovenkamp's argument that fear of unfairness to defendants, especially alien
defendants, supports an integrated reading of section 12).
250. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1416-17.
251. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 290.
254. Id. at 291, 290 n.l.
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section 12 based on the defendants' aggregate contacts with the nation.255
The district court also found that section 12's service of process provision
operated independently from its venue provision. 256 Two of the German
corporate defendants appealed the finding of personal jurisdiction in the
district to the Third Circuit.257
The Third Circuit acknowledged that there was a split among the circuits,
specifically between the D.C. Circuit (GTE New Media) and the Ninth
Circuit (Go-Video).258 The court relied on the Go-Video and Bucyrus-Erie
decisions and elected to endorse the Go-Video holding that section 12's
"service of process provision on foreign corporations is independent of, and
does not require satisfaction of, the specific venue provision under Section
12."259 Additionally, In re Automotive Paint compared section 12 of the
Clayton Act to section 27 of the '34 Act to support its conclusion. 260
The Automotive Paint court found the language of section 12 to be
neither clear nor unambiguous and rejected the "plain meaning" treatment
adopted in GTE New Media.261 The court next distinguished GTE New
Media and Goldlawr on the ground that those cases were brought against
out-of-state domestic corporate defendants, contrasted with In re
Automotive Paint, where foreign defendants raised the section 12 issue. 262
The court noted that "[t]he distinction is crucial" because section 12 venue
was easier to satisfy than the general venue provisions for domestic
defendants, but more difficult to satisfy than the alien venue provision and
that the purpose of section 12 was to make it easier for plaintiffs to establish
venue. 263 The court followed Go-Video and elected to read section 12 as a
broadening provision, if only when applied to alien defendants. 264
255. Id. at 291-92.
256. Id.; see In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2002 WL
31261330, at *6-10 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002).
257. In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 290.
258. Id. at 294.
259. Id. at 296-97.
260. Id. at 297 n.12, 297. But cf Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408,
426-27 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining why a comparison to section 27 of the '34 Act "offer[ed]
little help" in interpreting section 12 of the Clayton Act); see also supra notes 194-201 and
accompanying text.
261. In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 296 n.10. It is reasonable to conclude that there is not
a singular plain meaning of the statute given that courts and commentators that have come
out on both sides of the issue have resorted to utilizing statutory interpretation and the rules
of grammar to determine how the "in such cases" clause affects the reading of section 12.
Compare Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1989), Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), and Capra,
supra note 143, at 409 (arguing that a broad reading of section 12 is "a more reasonable
construction in terms of a fair reading of the statute"), with Daniel, 428 F.3d at 423-24, 14D
Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 114, § 3818 (generally agreeing with Hovenkamp that
an integrated reading was "the way it is written"), and Hovenkamp, supra note 174, at 509
(advocating an integrated reading because that is "the way it is written").
262. In reAuto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 296 n.10.
263. Id. (citing Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1041 n.5). However, the court failed to
recognize that the general venue provisions were amended in 1988, after Bucyrus-Erie was
decided, and did not explain exactly how section 12 venue was easier to establish than §
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Unlike the Second Circuit in Daniel,265 the Automotive Paint court found
support for its holding in section 27 of the '34 Act. 266 The court noted that
"[t]he two sections are remarkably similar in their provisions for venue and
service of process" '26 7 and found persuasive Judge Henry Friendly's
construction of section 27 in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell.268 The court stated that Judge Friendly wrote that the "in such
cases" clause spoke expressly to service of process and was distinct from
the venue provision in the section. 269
The court went on to hold, as all others have, that the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause is the only constitutional limit on the exercise of
personal jurisdiction under section 12 and that the nation as a whole is the
measure for a minimum contacts analysis. 270 The court thus held that
venue was satisfied under § 1391(d) and that section 12 of the Clayton Act
granted the court personal jurisdiction over the alien defendants. 271
b. Go-Video Goes Domestic: Proper Venue Under § 1391(b) and (c)
for Domestic Corporate Antitrust Defendants
The cases already discussed in Part II do not conflict. The cases
advocating an integrated reading have all dealt with domestic defendants,
while the cases advocating a broad reading in Part II.B.l.a have dealt with
foreign defendants; the two lines of cases are distinguishable on those
grounds.272 The following cases truly conflict with the cases advocating an
integrated reading in Part I.A, as they involve applying a broad reading of
section 12 to domestic antitrust defendants. Private plaintiffs are hauling
these domestic corporations into court in a district where they lack
purposeful affiliating contacts with the justification that they have sufficient
minimum contacts with the nation as a whole.
1391(b). The court did not have to explain this because In re Automotive Paint dealt with
foreign defendants and venue under § 1391(d). See In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 288.
Following the Third Circuit in In re Automotive Paint, in 2005 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Cumberland Truck Equipment Co. v. Detroit Diesel
Corp., expanded upon In re Automotive Paint's note that "[t]he distinction is crucial"
between alien and domestic corporate defendants. 401 F. Supp. 2d 415, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
The district court explicitly held that the broad reading only applies to alien defendants, id. at
420-21, while the integrated reading applies to domestic defendants, id. at 423-24. The
district court noted that "[r]equiring Plaintiffs to establish venue .. . exclusively under
Section 12 preserves the Third Circuit's alien-domestic distinction while reflecting a
coherent interpretation of antitrust precedent." Id. at 424.
264. In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 296-97.
265. See supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
266. In re Auto. Paint, 358 F.3d at 297-99.
267. Id. at 297.
268. Id. at 297 n.12 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 968 F. 2d
1326, 1340 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1972)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 298-99.
271. Id. at 296-97.
272. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 218, 262.
2007] 1213
FORDHA M LA W REVIEW
In [con Industrial Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc.,273 a Louisiana
corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana brought an
antitrust suit in the Western District of Louisiana against multiple
nonresident domestic corporate defendants. 274 Icon developed and sold
operating systems that controlled robotics and machine tools. 275  Icon
alleged that the defendants, against whom it competed, conspired to prevent
it from developing and selling a new operating system by disseminating
false information about the new system while it was under development. 276
Icon claimed it had lost time responding to the falsehoods and had lost
necessary collaborators as well. 27 7  The defendants submitted sworn
statements that they did not transact business or own property in Louisiana
and that they had no substantial contacts with the forum.278 Icon did not
contest this claim.279 The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and for improper venue, with the court observing that "[ilt is
not seriously contended that any of the defendants . .. have significant
contacts with Louisiana" and that "few, if any, of the events giving rise to
the dispute occurred in [Louisiana]. '280
In resolving the motion to dismiss, the court first noted that when a
federal statute grants worldwide service of process, the relevant measure for
a minimum contacts analysis is the nation as a whole.281 Presented with the
issue of how to interpret section 12, the court relied on Go-Video, despite
the defendants' effort to distinguish the case because it involved alien
defendants and venue through § 1391 (d) rather than § 1391 (b).282 The Icon
court found that the issue in both cases was identical, and concluded that
"[1]ogically, the [Go-Video] court's conclusion that the worldwide service
provision is available in all antitrust cases is not dependent on whether the
defendant is an alien." 283 The court found nothing in Go-Video to indicate
that § 1391(d) ought to be the only general venue provision that could
supplement section 12.284
Recognizing that reasonable arguments existed to support both
interpretations of section 12, the court concluded that an integrated reading
"makes little sense." 285 Instead, the court elected to follow Go-Video and
concluded that a broad reading of section 12 fits best with the overall policy
273. 921 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. La. 1996).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 376.
276. Id. at 376-77.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 377.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 376.
281. Id. at 378.
282. Id. at 380.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 382. In 1996, when the court decided Icon, Go-Video was the only decision by
a circuit court that squarely addressed the issue. Id.
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and purpose of the Clayton Act. 286 Having concluded that section 12
established personal jurisdiction over the non-Louisiana defendants, the
court then found that venue was proper in the district pursuant to a
combined reading of § 1391(b)(1) and (c). 287 The court concluded that the
defendants were residents in the district because they were subject to
personal jurisdiction there pursuant to § 1391(c) and that venue was proper
under § 1391(b)(1) because all defendants "reside" in the state. 288 The
defendants argued that finding venue under a combined reading of §
1391(b)(1) and (c) "renders unnecessary the special venue provisions
contained in Section 12" and "that Congress presumably intended the venue
provisions contained in Section 12 to have meaning." 289 In response, the
Louisiana court stated that the special venue provisions had meaning when
Congress enacted section 12 in 1914 and did not have a problem concluding
that the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c) made the venue provision of section
12 meaningless. 290
The Icon court dismissed the defendants' argument that the court's
reading of section 12 was fundamentally unfair by responding that any issue
of unfairness "is a policy issue best settled in the legislative arena." 29 1
Instead, it saw § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine as
preventing antitrust litigation from being brought in a district with no
connection to the parties or controversy.292 The court then went on to find
that the defendants did not meet their high burden of showing that there was
a more convenient forum and denied their motion to transfer.293 Thus, the
holding forced multiple non-Louisiana defendants with no significant
286. See id.; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text.
287. Icon Indus. Controls, 921 F. Supp. at 382-83.
288. Id. at 382.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 382-83; see also Lee supra note 143, at 695 (pointing out that section 12's
venue provision had meaning when enacted in 1914 because its venue provision was broader
than the general venue provision at the time, and also arguing that Congress's decision not to
modify section 12 when it enacted the general venue provisions currently in force is
indicative of congressional intent that the general venue provision "implicitly expanded
section 12 to this extensive reach"). While Lee's argument makes sense, it omits the fact
that courts are not simply allowing a plaintiff to establish venue under either the general
provision or the section 12 venue provision, but rather that courts are allowing section 12
personal jurisdiction to completely eviscerate the venue inquiry. Doing so makes venue
under section 12 more extensive than any general venue provision. Professor Rachel Janutis
argues that § 1391(c) corporate residence should be viewed as laying residence where a
corporation "is subject to personal jurisdiction independent of nationwide service of
process." Rachel M. Janutis, Pulling Venue Up by Its Own Bootstraps: The Relationship
Among Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and § 1391(c), 78 St. John's
L. Rev. 37, 79 (2004). It seems more reasonable that any congressional intent that can be
gleaned from Congress's decision to leave section 12 as it was when the general venue
provisions were amended is an intent in accord with Janutis's argument.
291. Icon Indus. Controls, 921 F. Supp. at 383.
292. Id. The court was likely referring to § 1404(a) as the federal forum non conveniens
statute because the traditional forum non conveniens doctrine does not apply to federal
antitrust litigation. See supra note 108.
293. Icon Indus. Controls, 921 F. Supp. at 383-85.
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contacts with the forum to litigate a claim for antitrust violations in a
Louisiana court that arose due to few, if any, events occurring in Louisiana
because the plaintiff claimed injury and filed suit in Louisiana.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit extended its Go-Video reasoning in Action
Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc.,294 a case involving only
domestic parties. 295  Two domestic corporations, one incorporated in
California and the other incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of
business in California, sued a Virginia corporation and a Virginia law firm
in district court in California in response to an allegedly meritless antitrust
suit filed against them in Virginia.296 In their California suit, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants pursued the Virginia litigation to achieve goals
that violated the antitrust laws. 297 The Virginia corporate defendant moved
to dismiss or transfer for lack of proper venue. 298 The trial court granted
the motion and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.299
The Virginia law firm, for its part, only moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.300  With respect to the law firm, the district court
granted the motion and dismissed the case.30 1 The plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal so that the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant law
firm was the only issue presented on appeal. 302
The court essentially restated its Go-Video rationale in holding that
section 12 establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant without
requiring satisfaction of section 12's venue provision.30 3 The court stated
that Go- Video stood for the proposition "that the special venue provision of
Section 12 is supplemented by the general venue provisions of § 1391 for
federal antitrust plaintiffs" '30 4 and went on to hold "that under Section 12 of
the Clayton Act, the existence of personal jurisdiction over an antitrust
defendant does not depend upon there being proper venue in that court. '305
The court notably did not discuss why the outcome should be the same
when a domestic defendant is sued, as in Action Embroidery, as compared
to when a foreign defendant is sued, as in Go- Video.
The court did not reach the question of whether venue was proper in
California. It simply concluded that personal jurisdiction existed over the
Virginia law firm in California under section 12 because section 12 grants
personal jurisdiction over any corporate antitrust defendant so long as the
294. 368 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2004).
295. Id.




300. Id. at 1176-77.
301. Id. at 1177.
302. Id. at 1176-77.
303. Id. at 1177-81.
304. Id. at 1177.
305. Id. at 1179-80.
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defendant has minimum contacts with the nation as a whole. 30 6 The court
continued, finding that the defendant, "a Virginia professional corporation
operating in the United States, . . . clearly had such minimum contacts. '30 7
Despite this holding, the circuit court noted on remand that the district court
could, in its discretion, transfer the case for improper or inconvenient venue
under the proper federal statutes. 308 Presumably, venue was proper because
the district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
that § 1391(c) equates residence to personal jurisdiction, and that §
1391 (b)(1) provides that venue is proper where the defendant resides. 309
In 2006, a Kentucky district court found another way to combine section
12 and § 1391. In Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. National Association of
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.,310 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky utilized section 12 in conjunction with § 1391(b)(2) to
find personal jurisdiction and venue properly established. 311 Kentucky
Speedway alleged that NASCAR and the International Speedway
Association (ISC) "monopolized and attempted to monopolize" the national
stock car racing market in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 312 ISC owns racetracks; the plaintiff alleged that NASCAR conspired
with ISC to make sure that most NASCAR races are held at ISC tracks,
which resulted in injury to plaintiffs business because it was unable to host
NASCAR races. 313
The court found venue proper under § 1391(b)(2) because of the alleged
injury to a Kentucky business from the alleged antitrust violations. 314 The
court concluded that the fact that the plaintiff was "damaged in the
operation of its business which is headquartered in Kentucky, '315 made the
district a proper one under § 1391(b)(2) because a "substantial part of the
events ... giving rise to claim occurred" in the district. 3 16 The court went
on to analyze the defendant's contacts with Kentucky and concluded that
additional discovery was necessary to establish personal jurisdiction
through the Kentucky long-arm statute. 317 The court, however, concluded
that this additional jurisdictional discovery was avoidable because section
12 conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to a broad
Go-Video reading of the statute. 318
306. Id. at 1180 (citing Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1989)).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1181.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 285-89.
310. 410 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 593.
313. Id. at 594.
314. Id. at 597-98.
315. Id. at 597.
316. Id. at 598 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (2000)).
317. Id. at 598.
318. Id. at 600-01.
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Supplementing section 12 venue with § 1391(b)(2) is more likely to
protect a defendant from litigating in a forum that lacks ties to the
underlying case than is the Icon reading where the court combined section
12 for personal jurisdiction with § 1391(b)(1) and (c) for venue. 3 19 Under
Icon, venue is proper in any district in the country so long as the corporate
antitrust defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole. 320
Under Kentucky Speedway, venue was proper under § 1391(b)(2) and
personal jurisdiction was established through section 12.321 Even where a
court does use § 1391(b)(1) and (c) to find venue, the district chosen is
typically the district where the plaintiff suffered the injury; if it were not,
the court would almost surely transfer the case pursuant to the federal venue
transfer statute. Therefore, supplementing section 12 venue with §
1391 (b)(2)-as opposed to § 1391 (b)(1) and (c)-has little if any impact on
the ultimate forum of the litigation. This is also the case because a liberal
reading of section 12's "transacts business" 322 would likely encompass any
situation where § 1391(b)(2)'s "claim arose" 323 requirement is satisfied.324
It is not certain that the converse is true: it is possible that a corporate
defendant could transact business in a district which would subject it to suit
in the district for a claim that did not arise there. 325
2. Impact on Private Antitrust Litigation
Thus, under a broad reading of section 12, a corporate antitrust
defendant, domestic or foreign, is subject to suit in any district in the United
States; venue and personal jurisdiction are satisfied so long as the defendant
has the requisite aggregate contacts with the nation as a whole. This
outcome has the effect of making it as easy as it is constitutionally
permissible for private plaintiffs to sue corporate antitrust defendants. The
only mechanism available to protect a defendant's right to litigate in a fair
and convenient forum is the federal venue transfer statute. Whether this
mechanism is sufficient depends on whether the plaintiffs right to easily
establish venue and personal jurisdiction when suing a corporate antitrust
defendant is greater than the defendant's right to litigate in a convenient
forum. The broad reading of section 12 effectively dispenses with the
statutory venue requirement to further section 12's purpose of making it
easier for a private plaintiff to sue a corporate defendant for antirust
violations.
319. See supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (2000).
324. See supra Part I.B.3.b.iii.
325. See supra note 143.
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Ill. A HYBRID SOLUTION
Congress could have saved the courts the trouble of resolving the section
12 issue by writing the section slightly differently. If Congress intended
that courts apply section 12 broadly, it could have written "in any and all
cases brought under the antitrust laws" instead of "in such cases." If
Congress intended that section 12 be applied as an integrated whole, it
could have written "in all cases where venue is established under this
section," instead of "in such cases." Congress can amend section 12 to
eliminate the controversy, but without congressional action, the courts must
settle the issue. Therefore, the question remains as to which reading the
courts should adopt.
In order to resolve the conflict, it is important to recognize the distinction
between personal jurisdiction and venue, two of the procedural elements
that a plaintiff must establish in order to bring an action in federal court. 326
Personal jurisdiction is necessary for the court to issue a binding personal
judgment over the defendant. 327 Due process of law requires that the court
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant to issue such a judgment.328
Therefore, personal jurisdiction is a constitutional requirement. Venue, on
the other hand, is purely a statutory creation, enacted by Congress to protect
the defendant from having to litigate in an unfair or inconvenient district
over and above those due process protections afforded by personal
jurisdiction.329 In cases arising under federal law, Congress has set specific
situations where venue is proper when a plaintiff sues a domestic
defendant,330 but has determined that a plaintiff may sue an alien defendant
in any judicial district in the United States.331 Therefore, although venue is
technically required when an alien defendant is sued, in reality there is no
venue inquiry that limits the plaintiffs choice because venue is proper in
any district in the United States.332 Instead, an alien defendant may utilize
the venue transfer statute and other venue escape mechanisms in the same
manner as a domestic defendant if the plaintiff brought suit in an unfair or
inconvenient district. 333
If Congress wanted to do so, it could eliminate the venue inquiry entirely
and leave the Constitution's Due Process clauses and the state long-arm
statutes as the only protection of domestic and alien defendants' rights.334
When the case presents a federal question or when process is served
pursuant to a federal statute, such as section 12 of the Clayton Act, the Fifth
326. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
327. See supra Part I.B.2.
328. See supra Part I.B.2.
329. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
330. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000).
331. See id. § 1391(d).
332. Id.
333. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
334. State legislatures can eliminate the long-arm inquiry by enacting an unenumerated
long-arm which leaves due process as the only protection. See supra note 90.
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Amendment Due Process Clause protects the defendant's due process
rights, regardless of whether the defendant is a domestic or alien
corporation. 335 Although the Supreme Court has declined to answer the
question, it appears settled that a national minimum contacts inquiry is
appropriate when the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is
implicated. 336
If anything is clear from the circuit split regarding how to interpret
section 12 of the Clayton Act, it is that there are reasonable arguments
supporting each interpretation and valid criticisms of both approaches. The
"plain meaning" hermeneutic is especially unhelpful because courts have
utilized it to support both the integrated and broad readings of section 12. 337
Essentially, the broad reading fits best with Congress's broad remedial
purpose of the private antitrust right of action, but the integrated reading fits
best with Congress's desire to protect defendants from inconvenient
litigation as evidenced by the structure of the general venue provisions.
Absent congressional action, a hybrid solution is the best way to resolve the
section 12 issue. The solution proposed in this Note attempts to resolve the
issue while staying true to both the purpose of venue limitations and the
purpose of the private antitrust right of action.
Courts can achieve the greatest solution to the section 12 issue by
considering both Daniel and Go-Video good law as to the class of
defendants sued in each action.338 The two cases are distinguishable on the
ground that Daniel's holding applies to domestic defendants and Go-
Video's holding applies to alien defendants. Properly viewed, the issue
presents two distinct questions: (1) how should courts apply section 12
when a plaintiff sues a domestic defendant, and (2) how should courts apply
section 12 when a plaintiff sues an alien defendant. 339
Congress has not provided specific guidance to the courts as to how to
apply section 12. However, Congress has indicated that domestic
defendants have greater rights to a fair and convenient trial location as
compared to alien defendants by enacting more restrictive venue
requirements for domestic defendants 340 than for alien defendants. 341
335. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
336. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
337. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
338. Daniel and Go-Video are referenced because they stand for the integrated reading
and the broad reading, respectively. However, the Third Circuit in In re Automotive Paint
best understood the issue, holding that the broad reading applied only to antitrust suits
brought against alien defendants. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d
288, 296 n.10 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that "the distinction is crucial" between suits brought
against alien corporations and merely out-of-state corporations); see also supra notes 262-63
and accompanying text.
339. The Third Circuit adopted this approach in In re Automotive Paint, applying the
broad reading to alien defendants and pointing out the distinction between the two types of
defendants. A district court within the Third Circuit followed suit and applied the integrated
reading to domestic defendants in Cumberland Truck Equipment Co. See supra notes 262-
63 and accompanying text.
340. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) (2000).
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Although the legislative history surrounding section 12 is sparse, it is clear
that at the time of its drafting, it was easier for private plaintiffs suing a
domestic corporate antitrust defendant to satisfy section 12's venue
provision than it was to satisfy the general venue provision.342 It is also
clear that section 12's service of process provision made it easier to serve a
corporate defendant validly.34 3 Congress's purpose in enacting section 12
was to make it easier for a plaintiff to sue a corporate defendant for an
antitrust violation. 344 It is unclear today, however, whether section 12's
venue provision is more liberal than § 1391(b) or if § 1391(b) is more
liberal than section 12.345 However, § 1391(d) is more clearly liberal than
section 12's venue provision as § 1391(d) allows for suit against an alien in
any district.346
A. Domestic Defendants
Regardless of whether section 12's venue provision will provide for
proper venue in a more liberal, restrictive, or the same manner as § 139 1(b),
an integrated reading is preferable to a broad reading of section 12, which is
tantamount to no venue inquiry at all.34 7 Congress has never legislatively
equated the venue inquiry to a nationwide contacts personal jurisdiction
inquiry when a domestic party is sued, and the courts should not bootstrap
venue to personal jurisdiction in this manner.348 Neither section 12 of the
Clayton Act nor the general venue provisions provide that "a corporate
antitrust defendant may be sued in any district." Courts that combine
section 12 with § 1391(c) and (b) and plaintiffs that argue for such a
combination read the two provisions as though Congress had passed such a
provision. As noted in Management Insights, a broad reading where §
1391(c) and (b) are taken in conjunction with section 12's service of
process provision "completely eviscerates any semblance of a venue inquiry
341. Seeid. § 1391(d).
342. See Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372
(1927).
343. See id. at 372-74 ("[W]e think it clear that, as applied to suits against corporations
for injuries sustained by violations of the Anti-Trust Act, its necessary effect was to enlarge
the local jurisdiction of the district courts so as to establish the venue of such a suit not only,
as theretofore, in a district in which the corporation resides or is 'found,' but also in any
district in which it 'transacts business' .... To construe the words 'or transacts business' as
adding nothing of substance.., would.., defeat the plain purpose of th[e] section.").
344. Id.
345. See supra Part I.B.3.b.iii.
346. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), with 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
347. See supra notes 180, 286 and accompanying text (advocating such an approach).
But see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (criticizing such an approach).
348. Professor Janutis argues that "[n]ationwide venue without regard for a defendant's
contacts seems contrary to the general principle that venue should make sure that a defendant
is not forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum." Janutis, supra note 290, at 47. Janutis
continues, "1391(c) should be read to mean that a corporation resides in a district only if the
corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction under International Shoe's minimum
contacts standard." Id. at 47-48.
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in antitrust cases involving corporate defendants." 349 Furthermore, section
12 does not explicitly grant venue in a more liberal manner than the general
venue provisions-it provides that venue is proper in certain specific
situations. 350 The fact that the general provisions may have expanded to the
point of section 12 venue, or even past section 12 venue, does not mean that
courts should expand the bounds of section 12 venue even further. As the
Supreme Court has eloquently noted, "In adopting [section] 12 Congress
was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul defendants hither and yon
at their caprice." 351  The courts should leave it to Congress to further
expand section 12's venue provision.
Congress has determined that domestic defendants have a statutory right
to litigate in a fair and convenient forum.352 This right is protected by the
venue requirements of section 12 and the general venue provisions. Courts
should not pick the provisions apart, put them together, and deny domestic
defendants this right. The broad remedial purpose of antitrust law should
not yield to Congress's clear intent that domestic defendants may be sued
only in certain districts because Congress has never evinced intent that
domestic parties may be sued in any district. Therefore, when a domestic
corporate defendant is sued for violating the antitrust laws, section 12
should be read as an integrated whole, so that the section's latter service of
process provision may be utilized only if venue was laid pursuant to the
section's former venue provision.
B. Alien Defendants
Alternatively, Congress has passed a venue provision that reads, "An
alien may be sued in any district. ' 353 It is unlikely that Congress is more
concerned with corporate alien-antitrust defendants than all other alien
defendants. Discussing § 139 1(d), the Supreme Court noted that the section
is "a declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are
wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and
special. '354 Moreover, Congress has evidenced its intent to protect all
defendants' right to avoid litigating in an unfair or inconvenient forum by
allowing for the venue transfer and other venue escape mechanisms to
apply equally to all defendants. 355  Venue law treats alien defendants
differently in that their sole right is a limited one that is addressed at the
349. Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531-32 (N.D. Tex.
2001).
350. See 15 U.S.C. § 22.
351. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948).
352. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000).
354. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972).
Again, this statement does not end the section 12 inquiry. An alien defendant may be sued
in any district. The question is, if the plaintiff uses § 1391(d) to lay venue, may the plaintiff
utilize section 12's service of process provision or must he serve process pursuant to the
state long-arm statute and the more restrictive minimum contacts with the state analysis?
355. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406.
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court's discretion. Therefore, the argument advanced by Professors Herbert
Hovenkamp, Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, and Edward Cooper that
section 12 should be read as an integrated whole as a matter of fairness,
especially fairness to alien defendants, 356 seems to ignore the fact that, as
Professor Capra argues, any element of fairness can be handled by a motion
to transfer. 357 Professor Daniel J. Capra also notes that under section 12,
alien defendants are no worse off than § 1391(d) makes them in non-
antitrust civil actions. 358  District courts should use § 1404(a) more
aggressively than they typically do when an alien defendant gets hauled into
court through section 12 and § 1391(d) because § 1391(d) presupposes that
personal jurisdiction in the forum is based on minimum contacts with the
forum state. 359 When plaintiffs utilize section 12, personal jurisdiction
serves no greater check on the defendant's contacts with the forum than §
1391(d).
In passing § 1391(d), Congress has sent a clear signal that any interest in
fairness to alien defendants is not so great that a plaintiffs choice of district
should be limited when suing an alien defendant. Courts should not limit
Congress's clear intent that private antitrust actions serve a broad remedial
purpose by an integrated reading of section 12 when applied to alien
defendants. Effectively, this hybrid solution preserves venue protections
for corporate domestic defendants while placing corporate alien defendants
in no worse a position than they would be subject to under § 1391(d).
CONCLUSION
It would be ideal if Congress amended section 12 and settled the issue.
However, until Congress does so, the courts must figure out how to
interpret section 12. If Congress wants section 12 to make it easier to sue a
corporate defendant for an antitrust violation than for other causes of action,
Congress should amend section 12 by further liberalizing the venue
provision (so that it is more liberal than § 1391) or simply allow plaintiffs
356. See supra note 174.
357. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Of course, the argument that § 1404(a)
can handle any element of unfairness can be made with respect to suits against domestic
corporations, but the crucial difference is that Congress has specifically limited the districts
where a plaintiff may lay venue when suing a domestic corporation; Congress has not
limited the districts where a plaintiff may lay venue when suing an alien defendant.
358. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
359. It is possible for an alien defendant to get hauled into a district court with proper
venue by way of § 1391(d) and personal jurisdiction by way of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2) which allows for personal jurisdiction over alien defendants who are not
subject to courts of general jurisdiction of any state based upon its contacts with the nation as
a whole. Congress put Rule 4(k)(2) in place to provide federal district courts with
jurisdiction over alien defendants who lack sufficient minimum contacts with any specific
state. None of the section 12 issue cases discussed mentioned Rule 4(k)(2) as an alternative
source of personal jurisdiction, but if a corporate alien antitrust defendant lacked sufficient
contacts with any particular state, Rule 4(k)(2) and § 1391(d) could be utilized together to
receive the same result as a broad reading of section 12. If such a situation arose, the district
courts should also use § 1404(a) more aggressively than they typically do.
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to sue corporate antitrust defendants (domestic and alien, or just alien) in
any district. Otherwise, Congress should clearly indicate in the statute that
plaintiffs may only utilize the service of process provision when they lay
venue through section 12 or that § 1391(c) may not be used to supplement
section 12's venue provision. Eliminating § 1391(c) as a supplement to
section 12 would coincide with the solution adopted in this Note because it
would extend greater protection to domestic defendants than to alien
defendants.
The solution proposed in this Note is relatively simple, but there is no
reason why a simple solution cannot be the best solution. The section 12
issue is ultimately not very complicated, but a court's reading of section 12
does have the ability to greatly affect a defendant's right to litigate in a fair
and convenient forum. Even if the circuit court eventually holds that suit
may not proceed in the district, as in Daniel,360 the corporate defendant may
be forced to litigate personal jurisdiction and venue for many years before
such a decision is rendered. Such a result does not truly further the purpose
of statutory venue, as it may be equally inconvenient to litigate procedural
matters even if the matter is eventually settled in favor of the defendant.
Any ambiguity concerning how courts should apply section 12 cuts against
the section's purpose of making it easier for private plaintiffs to sue
corporate antitrust violators. Ease of suing is not furthered if a plaintiff is
unsure about where he can actually sue under section 12. Therefore, if only
to eliminate a possibly extensive amount of pretrial litigation and truly
make it easier for plaintiffs to sue, it is imperative that the conflict presented
in this Note be resolved definitively either by the courts or by Congress.
360. See supra note 180.
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